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Abstract
We show that the global human capital increase during the 20th-
century contributed to structural transformation. We document that
almost half of the decline in aggregate agricultural employment was
driven by new birth cohorts entering the labor market. We use data
on educational attainment and compile a comprehensive list of policy
reforms to interpret the differences in agricultural employment across
cohorts. We find that the increase in schooling led to a sharp reduction
in the agricultural labor supply by equipping younger cohorts with skills
more valued out of agriculture. Interpreted through a model of frictional
labor reallocation, these facts imply that human capital growth accounts
for about 20% of the global decline in agricultural employment.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two centuries, economic development has typically been accompanied by
a process of structural transformation: as countries grow richer, workers reallocate from
agriculture to manufacturing and services. The literature has emphasized two mechanisms
to explain this pattern: a decrease in the relative demand of agricultural goods driven
by income effects and an increase in the relative productivity of the agricultural sector
(Herrendorf et al., 2014). Both these forces amount to a shift in the relative demand for
agricultural labor: keeping fixed their characteristics, workers are progressively more needed
in the non-agricultural sector.
However, the labor force itself has been subject to a radical transformation: a global
increase in human capital, facilitated by an unprecedented expansion of formal education.
In 1950, a 25-year-old man randomly extracted from the world population would have spent,
on average, less than four years of his life in a classroom; in 2010, almost nine and a half.1
If human capital is more useful outside of agriculture, as suggested by the evidence on the
sorting of high-skilled workers across sectors, the increase in schooling might have moved
the comparative advantage of many workers away from agriculture. In turn, this shift in
the relative supply of agricultural labor might have been an important driver of structural
transformation. This mechanism, first advanced by Caselli and Coleman II (2001) in the
US context, has received little empirical scrutiny in the structural change literature.
This paper formally studies this hypothesis, with the overarching goal of understanding
whether increases in human capital have contributed to structural transformation on a
global scale. The answer to this question has crucial policy implications. To the extent that
schooling is important in this context, educational policy should be considered part of the
toolkit of governments wishing to accelerate the process of structural transformation and
economic development.
Addressing this question involves a number of challenges. First, several relevant dimen-
sions of human capital are difficult to capture through observable proxies such as years of
schooling; for example, schooling quality, educational content and early-childhood human
capital accumulation are likely to have changed over time as well. Second, reliable wage
data - which could in principle be used to discriminate between demand and supply shifts
in the market for agricultural labor - are scarce for developing countries, especially for the
agricultural sector. Third, the contribution of human capital growth to structural trans-
formation is likely to be mediated by several general equilibrium effects, which would be
missed by a micro-level empirical analysis.
To overcome these difficulties, our analysis combines an empirical cross-cohort analysis of
1Authors’ calculations using Barro and Lee (2013).
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labor reallocation with a two-sector general equilibrium model of structural transformation.
Our empirical approach is based on a simple premise: the quantity and quality of education
vary across successive cohorts, but they are, for working-age individuals, mostly constant
within a cohort over time. This suggests that the extent to which reallocation out of
agriculture happens across as opposed to within cohorts is informative on the role of human
capital for structural transformation. While changes in the demand for agricultural labor
should affect different cohorts similarly, supply shifts due to human capital accumulation
should be reflected in differences across cohorts. Building on this insight, we show that the
cross-cohort variation in sectoral employment at a given point in time can be used to identify
the extent to which changes in human capital have shifted the supply of agricultural labor
over time. Through the lens of our model, we then quantify the implications of such shift and
the resulting general equilibrium effects for the aggregate rate of structural transformation.
We find that the decrease in agricultural labor supply accounts for about 20% of the world
decline in agricultural employment.
We start from a simple statistical decomposition of the observed aggregate rate of labor
reallocation into changes across and within cohorts. We use repeated cross-sections of micro-
level data for 69 countries around the world, covering two thirds of the world population and
a large part of the income distribution. We run cohort-level regressions of log agricultural
employment on year and cohort dummies and calculate the extent to which changes in
the estimated cohort effects for the active cohorts can account for the aggregate rate of
reallocation. Naturally, part of the differences in agricultural employment across cohorts
might reflect factors associated with age as opposed to fixed cohort-level characteristics; for
example, mobility barriers that are likely to be more binding for older workers. To account
for this, we also consider a version of our decomposition exercise which separately controls
for age and cohort effects.2
We find a substantial role for labor reallocation across cohorts. Across countries in our
sample, when age effects are controlled for, changes in cohort effects can account on average
for about 40% of the overall reallocation out of agriculture. While there is some heterogene-
ity across countries, the contribution of cohort effects is substantial in the overwhelming
majority of them. Overall, our results point towards the importance of cross-cohort changes
in workers’ characteristics for structural transformation.
We then provide several pieces of evidence to support our interpretation of cohort effects
as shifts in human capital. As a starting point, we show that, within each country, faster
increases in schooling across cohorts are associated with faster declines in cohort effects. In
2The separate identification of year, cohort, and age effects requires at least one linear restriction. We
restrict age effects to be zero in the first few years a cohort is active. This restriction is motivated by our
model, and captures the idea that mobility costs, as long as they are not too large, affect equally the sectoral
decisions of consecutive cohorts at the beginning of their career.
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other words, periods with fast improvement in educational attainment have been followed
by a large decrease in agricultural employment of the affected cohorts. We then explore,
along several dimensions, the determinants of schooling increases to support a causal link
between educational attainment and sectoral choices. First, historical data on GDP per
capita show that cohorts exposed to economic booms while growing up spend relatively
more time in school and have lower estimated cohort effects. Second, we compile a novel
dataset on educational reforms and political events (such as independence and democratic
transitions) in the countries in our sample. Cohorts exposed to reforms or events that
increased their schooling also have lower subsequent agricultural employment. Third, we
follow the identification strategy in Duflo (2001), and exploit a school construction program
in Indonesia as a shock to educational attainment: the cohorts more affected by the program
are less likely to be employed in agriculture. Taken together, the evidence strongly suggests
that schooling and educational policy can be important drivers of sectoral reallocation.
We interpret our empirical results through the lens of a general equilibrium model of
frictional labor reallocation out of agriculture. The model has three exogenous driving forces:
the human capital of new cohorts, the relative sectoral productivity, and a shifter affecting
the relative demand for agricultural goods.3 Workers decide in which sector to work, subject
to mobility frictions; firms in both sectors compete for workers. Goods and labor markets
clear in equilibrium, determining the relative agricultural price and wage. Human capital
is more valued in the non-agricultural sector, which implies that the supply of agricultural
labor depends on the average level of human capital of the active cohorts. The demand
for agricultural labor, on the other hand, is determined by the relative agricultural revenue
productivity. Changes in the relative supply and demand of agricultural labor determine
the equilibrium rate of labor reallocation out of agriculture.
The model provides a structural interpretation of our decomposition exercise. First, our
theory guides us in the selection of the restriction that we need in order to separately identify
cohort, year, and age effects. Mobility costs affect the level of agricultural employment for
all cohorts, but - as long as they are not too large - not the rate of reallocation for relatively
young cohorts; as a consequence, restricting the age effects to be identical in the first few
periods that a cohort is active allows to identify cohort and year effects. Moreover, if the
data are generated by our model, cohort effects estimated under this restriction measure the
cohort-level average human capital, and the change over time in the average of the estimated
cohort effects (for the active cohorts) captures the shift in agricultural labor supply driven
by human capital growth. Year dummies absorb changes in the demand for agricultural
3In reality, of course, the three forces are jointly determined. For example, higher productivity in
human capital intensive sectors might make investment in human capital more valuable. One merit of our
methodology is to isolate the contribution of human capital to structural transformation without the need
to take a stand on the deep causes of the human capital increase.
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labor, while age controls capture the effect of reallocation frictions.
Through the lens of the model, the decomposition results imply a dramatic decline in the
agricultural labor supply over time. Keeping prices fixed, this decline explains, on average,
almost 40% of aggregate labor reallocation out of agriculture. The general equilibrium
impact of this shift is mediated by a combination of the model’s parameters - the general
equilibrium multiplier - that controls the responsiveness of relative wages and prices. We
consider two alternative approaches to quantify the multiplier: calibration and a regression-
based exercise exploiting the variation over time in the estimated cohort effects and labor
reallocation. In both cases, we conclude that general equilibrium forces attenuate the partial
equilibrium impact of human capital growth, which on average accounts for about 20% of
the observed rate of reallocation.
Overall, our results show that human capital accumulation dramatically transformed
the labor force, shifting labor supply away from agriculture. This shift contributed in a
quantitatively important way to the reallocation of employment across sectors. Based on
this, we conclude that any credible quantitative analysis of structural transformation cannot
fail to consider – as has been mostly done in the literature so far – its “human” side.
Related Literature. We build on the work of Caselli and Coleman II (2001) and Ace-
moglu and Guerrieri (2008). To our knowledge, Caselli and Coleman II (2001) first argued
that the supply of agricultural workers might be relevant to understand structural change.
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) build on an insight first proposed by Rybczynski (1955) and
formalize the notion that changes in the supply of different inputs may lead to structural
transformation if sectors vary in the intensity with which they use them. Our contribution
is to develop and apply a methodology to measure changes in the supply of agricultural
workers for many countries, link them to changes in schooling, and quantify their aggregate
impact. In this sense, we add to a literature studying the quantitative role of changes in
the demand for agricultural labor, driven by preferences or technology (Alvarez-Cuadrado
and Poschke, 2011; Boppart, 2014; Comin et al., 2015).
More broadly, our work is related to a large literature on the contribution of human
capital to growth and development. While most of this literature focuses on the relation
between human capital and income per capita (see for example Nelson and Phelps (1966),
Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), and more recently Valencia Caicedo (2018)), we mea-
sure the effects of changes in human capital on the supply of agricultural workers and the
reallocation of labor out of agriculture. In this context, our cross-cohort analysis quantifies
the role of human capital without relying on proxies based on wages or years of schooling,
in line with growing evidence that these proxies miss a significant part of the variation in
human capital across countries and over time (see Rossi, 2018, for a review).
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Our model combines elements and insights already present in Matsuyama (1992b), Lucas
(2004), and more recently Herrendorf and Schoellman (2018) and Bryan and Morten (2019).
We provide a tractable framework to analytically characterize labor reallocation by cohort in
the presence of mobility frictions, which have been shown to affect significantly agricultural
workers in developing countries (Ngai et al., 2018). Hsieh et al. (2019) also exploit year and
cohort effects to calibrate a model of allocation of talent; compared to their work, we focus on
a simpler framework that allows us to analytically consider fixed-cost-type frictions, which
turn out to be crucial to correctly identify the role of changes in the supply of agricultural
workers. In emphasizing the importance of comparative advantage, our work also relates to
Lagakos and Waugh (2013), Young (2013) and Nakamura et al. (2016).
Finally, with respect to the aim of separating the role of labor demand and supply as
drivers of sectoral shifts, our paper is closely related to the work of Lee and Wolpin (2006),
which devises and structurally estimates a rich model of the process of labor reallocation
from manufacturing to services in the United States. We study a conceptually similar
question, though in a different context (the transition out of agriculture along the process
of development). Moreover, we tackle it from a radically different perspective, imposing the
minimal possible structure to interpret patterns of reallocation by cohort. The combination
of cohort-level evidence and a model capturing general equilibrium effects makes our work
related to a growing literature exploiting micro-level variation to discipline macroeconomic
models (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018).
Structure of the Paper. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data,
while Section 3 lays out the basic statistical decomposition of aggregate labor reallocation
into cohort and year effects. In Section 4 we provide several pieces of evidence on the
relationship between schooling and the estimated cohort effects. Section 5 presents the
model and Section 6 illustrates the quantitative results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
Our main source of data is the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS, see King
et al. (2019)). IPUMS data include censuses or large-sample labor force surveys that are
representative of the entire population. To improve the coverage of the poorest countries in
the world, we supplement IPUMS with the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS, see Boyle
et al. (2019)), a collection of small-sample surveys focused on health variables that include
information on agricultural employment.
For our benchmark analysis, we include all countries for which we have two or more
repeated cross-sections spanning at least ten years, with available information on industry
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of employment for men aged 25 to 59.4 We focus on this age range to capture working-age
individuals with completed education, and exclude women from the analysis given that their
low labor force participation in many countries makes it difficult to properly compute the
cohort-level reallocation across sectors.5 This gives us a sample of 58 countries and 241
cross-sections, covering more than two thirds of the world population, five continents and
most of the income distribution. The IPUMS data include 52 countries, of which 9 are
high-income, 24 are middle-income and 19 are low-income; all the 12 countries in the DHS
data are low-income (some countries are in both IPUMS and DHS).6 On average, we observe
countries over a period of 27 years in the IPUMS data and of 15 years in the DHS data. For
robustness, we also consider an extended sample including all countries with cross-sections
spanning at least five years and industry information for men aged 25 to 54; this gives us 2
more middle-income countries in the IPUMS data and 13 more low-income countries in the
DHS data, for a total of 69 countries and 285 cross-sections.
Our key variable of interest is agricultural employment at the cohort level. We use the
variables indgen (IPUMS) and wkcurrjob (DHS), which are harmonized across countries and
time periods, to compute the share (properly weighted) of the male population employed
in the industry “Agriculture, fishing and forestry”.7 Figure A.IIIa shows, for each country,
the average number of observations at the cohort ⇥ year level. For almost all countries in
IPUMS, we have at least 1000 observations per cell. Sample sizes in the DHS data are much
smaller. For this reason, we use the 52 countries in IPUMS as our core sample, and report
results from the DHS as robustness checks.8
We subject our data to three consistency checks. First, we inspect visually, for all coun-
tries, the growth rates in aggregate agricultural employment between cross-sections, search-
ing for anomalies. This procedure leads us to exclude one observation from the IPUMS
data, and two from the DHS.9 Second, we inspect visually the cross-sectional relationships
between agricultural employment and birth year. We exclude ten cross-sections from the
4We exclude cross-sections for which information on industry is missing (which is always the case for the
not employed) for more than 25% of men aged 35 to 45. Figure A.I shows that this restriction excludes
only very few cross-sections. All the figures and tables labeled A. are included in the Online Appendix.
5As Figures A.IIa and A.IIb show, the average employment rate of men aged 25-59 is high and constant.
6By high-income (low-income) countries we mean those with GDP per capita greater (smaller) than 45%
(10%) of the one of the United States at PPP, in 2000. We use GDP per capita from the Maddison Project
Database. Data for Fiji is missing; we assign it to the low-income countries. Puerto Rico is a territory, but
we label it a country.
7In computing the agricultural employment share, we do not restrict the sample to individuals in the
labor force. As we highlight in Figure A.IIc, we do not want to confound entry into the labor force with
reallocation out of agriculture. We consider alternatives for robustness.
8In several countries, we observe age heaping. We use a standard procedure, illustrated in Figure A.IV,
to get a smooth distribution of agricultural employment as a function of age.
9We drop the reallocation between 2000 and 2005 for the United States (which corresponds to a change
in the sectoral classification) and the reallocation between 2015 and 2016 and between 2016 and 2017 for
Senegal. The details are in Figure A.VI and notes.
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DHS data that display very large swings across birth cohorts, casting doubts on data re-
liability.10 Finally, we verify that the average agricultural employment computed in our
final sample is comparable in magnitude with aggregate data from the World Development
Indicators (see Figure A.V) – a commonly used data source (Herrendorf et al., 2014).
3 Decomposing Structural Change
We study patterns of labor reallocation out of agriculture by birth cohort. While most
of the existing work focuses on aggregate rates of reallocation, we are among the first to
systematically document micro-level evidence on the behavior of different cohorts in the
process of structural transformation.11
3.1 Cohort and Year Components of Labor Reallocation
In each country j, for each cross section t, and for each cohort c, we compute the share
of the population in agriculture, lA,t,c,j. We normalize c to be equal to the birth year plus
25, so that a cohort first enters into our dataset when c = t and is last in the dataset when
c = t + N , where N = 59   25 = 34. The overall share of the population employed in
agriculture is given by
LA,t,j =
tX
c=t N
nt,c,jlA,t,c,j ,
where nt,c,j is the share of the overall male population aged 25 to 59 belonging to cohort c.
Our objective is to decompose changes over time in LA,t,j into a component that captures
country-wide trends, and a component that captures changes in the composition of the
active labor force.
A Graphical Inspection. As an illustration, we regress, separately for high-, middle-,
and low-income countries, log lA,t,c,j on country fixed effects and dummies that take value one
for each decade from 1960 to 2010. Figure Ia plots the resulting decade effects, normalized to
the average agricultural employment share in the sample. The figure shows two well-known
facts: (i) high-income countries have lower agricultural employment; and (ii) labor has
reallocated away from agriculture. It also shows that the share of agricultural employment
declined at a log-linear rate, a feature of the data that we leverage in the model.
Next, we run the same specifications, but adding a full set of birth-year dummies. Figure
10For most countries, the first available cross-section from the DHS data is extremely noisy. Cote d’Ivoire
has only two cross-sections, hence excluding the first one leads us to exclude Cote d’Ivoire altogether. The
plots of all the omitted cross-sections are in Figure A.VII.
11Kim and Topel (1995), Lee and Wolpin (2006), and Perez (2017) document sectorial reallocation by
cohort, but limit their focus to, respectively, South Korea, United States and Argentina. In ongoing work,
Hobijn et al. (2019) are also using the IPUMS dataset to document patterns on reallocation by cohort.
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Ib shows that, when controlling for cohort effects, the estimated decade dummies decline
at a much slower rate. The decline in agricultural employment obtained by following a
given birth cohort over time is approximately half of the aggregate decline. This is because
the aggregate decline is partly driven by compositional changes, as showed in Figure Ic:
younger birth cohorts have a lower share of agricultural employment in any given year. We
also notice that, especially in middle- and low-income countries, the relationship between
birth year and agricultural employment is steeper for cohorts born after 1940. We will
return to this fact later.
Figure I: Decomposing Labor Reallocation
(a) Year Effects Only
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(b) Year Effects, Controlling for Cohort Effects
.005
.01
.02
.04
.08
.16
.32
Re
lat
ive
 A
gr
icu
ltu
ra
l E
m
plo
ym
en
t
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
High Income
Mid Income
Low Income
(c) Cohort Effects, Controlling for Year Effects
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Notes: the Figures show the point estimates for year and cohort effects, renormalized to average to the
overall agricultural employment in our samples. Figure Ib includes for comparison purposes the estimates
in Figure Ia (lighter lines). The y-axis is on a log scale.
Taken together, Figures Ia and Ib highlight that aggregate structural transformation
is the result of two equally important mechanisms: (i) over time, individuals of all birth
cohorts move away from agricultural employment – we call this the year component of labor
reallocation, since it captures country-wide trends; (ii) younger cohorts that enter the labor
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market are less likely to be employed in agriculture – we call this the cohort component of
labor reallocation, since it captures changes in the composition of the active labor force.
Two examples. To further illustrate the role of year and cohort components in driv-
ing aggregate reallocation, Figures IIa and IIb plot agricultural employment by cohort for
two countries. In Brazil, the year component largely drives aggregate reallocation: within
each given cohort, a large share of individuals reallocates out of agriculture over time. In
Indonesia, the cohort component plays a more important role: there is no systematic within-
cohort time trend in agricultural employment, and, in any given year, younger cohorts are
less likely to work in agriculture. As younger cohorts enter the labor market and older ones
exit, aggregate agricultural employment decreases as a result.
Figure II: Labor Reallocation By Cohort, Two Examples
(a) Brazil
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Notes: the Figures plot agricultural employment by birth cohort in Brazil and Indonesia. We follow six
birth cohorts between the ages of 25 and 59, or as long as we observe them in our data. We highlight with
solid dots the years in which we observe agricultural employment. The ages of all cohorts in any observed
year are reported.
Formal decomposition. We regress separately for each country the cohort-level agricul-
tural employment on year and cohort effects,
log lA,t,c,j| {z }
agr share of cohort c at time t
= Yt,j|{z}
year effects
+ Cc,j|{z}
cohort effects
+ "t,c,j. (1)
and use the resulting estimates to unpack the aggregate rate of labor reallocation into year
and cohort components.12 The average yearly rate of labor reallocation between periods t
12We estimate equation (1) in first differences to provide a tight mapping with the model in section 5.
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and t+ kt,j for country j is
log gLA,t,j ⌘
1
kt,j
log
LA,t+kt,j
LA,t
,
where we define kt,j as the number of years between cross-section t and the next cross-section
in our data. We can write log gLA,t,j as
log gLA,t,j| {z }
rate of labor reallocation
= log t,j| {z }
year component
+ log t,j| {z }
cohort component
(2)
where
log t,j ⌘ 1
kt,j
(Yt+k,j   Yt,j) (3)
log t,j ⌘ 1
kt,j
log
 Pt+kt,j
c=t+kt,j N nt+k,c,j exp (Cc,j)Pt
c=t N nt,c,j exp (Cc,j)
!
= log gLA,t,j   log t,j. (4)
The year component log t,j is the difference between the year effects at time t and t+ kt,j,
while the cohort component log t,j captures changes in the average cohort effects of the
active cohorts. We compute log t,j and log t,j for each pair of cross-sections and calculate
their average as
log j =
1
|Tj |
P
t2Tj log t,j, log j =
1
|Tj |
P
t2Tj log t,j
where Tj is the set of all cross-sections available for country j excluding the most recent
one, for which we cannot calculate the reallocation rate. The decomposition of the average
reallocation rate between log j and log j summarizes the patterns of reallocation by cohort
shown, for example, in Figure II: the year component log j is the average slope of the
cohorts’ paths, while the cohort component log j is the average vertical gaps across cohorts,
properly annualized.
Figures IIIa and IIIb plot the year and cohort components against the average real-
location rate. For the overwhelming majority of countries, both the year and the cohort
components are negative, hence they contribute to aggregate labor reallocation. Further-
more, countries with faster reallocation have usually larger (in absolute value) year and
cohort components, although the year components explain a larger share of cross-country
variance.13
13Figure A.VIII shows that the results are similar if we treat each cross-section as an independent obser-
vation – i.e. if we plot log t,j , and log t,j as a function of log gLA,t,j .
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Figure III: Unpacking Aggregate Labor Reallocation
(a) Year Components
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(b) Cohort Components
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Notes: the left Figure plots, across countries, the year component as a function of the reallocation rate.
The right Figure plots the cohort component as a function of the reallocation rate.
Table I summarizes the decomposition results. Across all countries, the agricultural
employment declines on average by 2.05% each year, of which 0.83% is due to the year
component. Therefore, as showed in column 4, 60% of the aggregate reallocation is due to
the cohort component. The contribution of the cohort component to aggregate reallocation
is similar for all income groups. Table A.IV shows the results for each country in our sample.
Table I: Unpacking Structural Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country Type log gLA log log  ˜
log 
log gLA
log e 
log gLA
1  log 
log  ˜
N. Obs
All -2.05 -0.83 -1.27 0.60 0.38 0.28 52
High Income -3.42 -1.40 -1.44 0.59 0.58 0.02 9
Middle Income -2.12 -0.88 -1.55 0.58 0.27 0.32 24
Low Income -1.30 -0.51 -0.83 0.61 0.36 0.39 19
3.2 Controlling for Age
The statistical decomposition considered so far restricts age to have no effect on the
cohort-level agricultural share. However, older workers plausibly face stronger barriers to
reallocate across sectors, limiting their labor mobility over time. In the absence of age
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controls, this will contribute to a large role of cohort effects for the aggregate rate of labor
reallocation. Therefore, we next include age controls in the previous decomposition.
It is well known that year, cohort and age are collinear, and can be separately identified
only if an additional linear restriction is imposed.14 Our restriction is that age has no effect
in the first few years a cohort is employed. This choice is guided by theory, and will be fully
motivated in the context of our model in Section 5. Intuitively, this amounts to assuming
that frictions to labor reallocation affect equally consecutive cohorts at the beginning of
their working career.
In the implementation of this idea, we face a trade-off between the parametrization
of age effects and the sample size for the identification of year effects. At one extreme,
a specification including a full set of age dummies, with the coefficients on the first two
restricted to be equal to each other, would identify year effects out of the reallocation
behavior of one cohort only. To strike a balance between the two sides of this trade-off, we
follow Card et al. (2013) and include quadratic and cubic terms for age, centered around a
value a¯ to be specified below. Separately for each country j, we run
log lA,t,c,j = Y˜t,j + C˜c,j +  1,j (ac,t,j   a¯)2 +  2,j (ac,t,j   a¯)3 + "t,c,j, (5)
where Y˜t,j and C˜c,j denote year and cohort dummies, and ac,t,j is the age of cohort c at
time t (for country j). This specification restricts age effects to be 0 at age a¯, both in levels
and in changes.15 Since our data come from repeated cross-sections that are on average -
across all countries and time periods - 8.8 years apart, we set a¯ = 29.4, i.e. the average
age of the youngest cohort that we observe for at least two successive cross-sections. We
explore several alternative specifications for age effects in Table A.VII, including country-
specific values for a¯, more flexible age dummies, and time-varying age controls; the results
are similar to those shown below.
Given the estimates from specification (5), we compute, just as in Section 3.1, the
annualized year and cohort components
log e t,j ⌘ 1
kt,j
⇣eYt+k,j   eYt,j⌘
log e t,j ⌘ log gLA,t,j   log e t,j
and take their average across all available cross-sections, log e j and log e j.
14See Deaton (1997), and more recently Lagakos et al. (2018).
15In fact, the omission of a linear term for age is necessary to have the derivative of the age terms to be
zero at a¯, which is needed for identification of the year trend.
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Figure IV plots log e j as a function of log j. Controlling for age matters: almost all
countries lie below the 45-degree line, which means that the year components estimated
with age controls is larger (in absolute value). Younger birth cohorts, which are less likely
to be constrained by mobility frictions, reallocate across sectors at a faster rate. However,
even conditional on age, the cohort component of aggregate reallocation is still substantial.
Column 3 of Table I shows that the average year component log e j is  1.3%, which implies
that the cohort component still explains almost 40% of the total reallocation out of agri-
culture, as shown in column 5.16 Table I and Figure IV also show that controlling for age
effects has a larger impact on the estimated cohort components for middle- and low-income
countries. We will return to this result in Section 5, where we show that the ratio between
log e j and log j directly maps into the structural parameters modulating mobility frictions.
Figure IV: Age Controls and Reallocation Frictions
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Notes: the Figure plots the year component estimated with age controls – log e j – as a function of the year
component estimated without age controls – log  ¯j . The markers are black for high income countries, gray
for middle income countries, and light gray for the low income countries. The 45-degree line shows that in
most countries log e j is larger than log  ¯j in absolute value.
4 Understanding Cohort Effects: Evidence from Schooling Data
We have shown that cohort effects explain a large share of aggregate labor reallocation.
Given the same aggregate conditions, younger birth cohorts are less likely to work in agri-
culture: the data reveal that they have a comparative advantage for non-agriculture. What
determines the shift across cohorts in comparative advantage? This section provides several
pieces of evidence to support the interpretation of cohort effects as shifts in human capital.
16Table A.VII shows that the results are similar when focusing on the DHS sample.
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4.1 Correlation between Schooling and Cohort Effects
We start by documenting that the cohort effects estimated in Section 3 are correlated
with cohort-level educational attainment. We use individual-level educational attainment
to compute the average schooling years for each cohort in our dataset. Since we observe
cohorts in multiple cross-sections, we extract average schooling by cohort using, separately
for each country, a procedure similar to the one used in DeLong et al. (2003) for the United
States. More specifically, we project the log of cohort-level average schooling years on a full
set of cohort dummies and a cubic polynomial in age, which controls for late enrollment in
school (i.e. after 25 years of age) and, especially, mortality and morbidity differences by
education groups. We transform the estimated cohort dummies in levels, and denote the
resulting schooling level for cohort c in country j as sc,j.
As a first step, Figure Va replicates Figure Ic, but using schooling rather than agricultural
employment. The relationship between years of education and birth cohorts mirrors the one
for agricultural employment. Schooling increased across the world, and, especially in low-
and middle-income countries, this increase was faster for the cohorts born after 1940. A
visual comparison of the two Figures suggests that the schooling increase might have played
a role in shaping the comparative advantage of younger generations. At the same time, the
comparison might be confounded by several factors; most obviously, similar time trends in
both variables.
Figure V: Educational Attainment and Agricultural Employment
(a) Schooling by Birth Cohort
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Notes: the left figure replicates Figure Ic using cohort-level schooling rather than agricultural employment.
The right figure plots for each country the point estimate of  ˆj from specification (6). Black circles and gray
triangles are for IPUMS and DHS countries for which  ˆj are negative and significant at 5%. Observations
in red are not significantly different from 0. We exclude from the figure the highest and lowest observations:
 ˆARG = 0.307 and  ˆCHE =  0.462.
14
To make progress, we estimate specifications that control for quadratic time trends. We
run, separately for each country,
C˜c,j = ↵j +  jsc,j +  1,j (c  c¯j) +  2,j (c  c¯j)2 + "c,j, (6)
where C˜c,j is the cohort effect estimated in (5), and c¯j is the first cohort that we observe in
each country. The coefficient of interest is  j; Figure Vb plots it as a function of GDP. For
all countries but one, the coefficient is negative: cohorts that are more educated, relative
to a country-specific quadratic trend, are less likely to work in agriculture. While the
coefficient  j is negative and significant in almost all countries, there is some heterogeneity;
in particular, one extra year of schooling in rich countries appears to have a larger effect
on agricultural employment.17 To focus on one magnitude, we run specification (6) pooling
all countries together, allowing for country-specific time trends. The first column of Table
II reports the results: one additional year of schooling decreases cohort-level agricultural
employment by approximately 10% relative to what it woud have been otherwise. The result
is robust to the inclusion of decade of birth dummies interacted by income group (column
2).
Table II: Role of Schooling
Dependent Variable: Cohort Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cohort Schooling -0.104 -0.113 -0.099 -0.087 -0.170 -0.185
(0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.022) (0.039) (0.038)
Country Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
Birth-Year Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Method OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Instrument - - GDP Cycle GDP Cycle Edu
Reforms
Edu
Reforms
F Stat First Stage - - 14.50 6.20 2.75 2.24
Observations 3238 3238 2778 2778 907 907
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The country trends include both linear and quadratic terms.
Birth-year controls are a full set of decade of birth dummies interacted with income group dummies.
We should be cautious in interpreting this relationship as causal. In particular, cohort-
level average schooling might be correlated with other cohort-level characteristics that affect
17These patterns hold for DHS countries as well, identified by triangles in Figure Vb: the estimates of  j
are negative and mostly significant, and smaller in magnitude compared to those of richer IPUMS countries.
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sectoral choices, such as average early-childhood human capital investments, ability or pref-
erences. Moreover, if educational decisions are forward-looking, changes in schooling might
be ultimately driven by the anticipation of higher demand for non-agricultural labor (rela-
tive to the quadratic trend).18 While most of these possibilities are broadly consistent with
the core thesis of this paper - i.e. human capital being an important driver of the supply of
agricultural labor - establishing whether schooling plays an independent and direct role is
important, as formal educational attainment is, at least partially, under the direct influence
of educational policy. In the rest of this section, we present several approaches to make
progress in this direction.
Figure VI: Effect of GDP at birth on Agricultural Employment and Schooling
(a) Years of School
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Notes: the left Figure shows the point estimates and 90% confidence intervals for  x from the regression
sc,j =  j +  1,j (c  c¯j) +  2,j (c  c¯j)2 +
P18
x=0  xyx,j + "c,j , where  j is a country fixed effect and yx,j are
the cyclical components of GDP per capita at birth, and at ages 1 to 18 experienced by cohort c in country
j. The right Figure shows the corresponding estimates from a regression with the estimated cohort effects
C˜c,j rather than schooling sc,j as left hand side variable.
4.2 Persistent Effects of Growing up in a Recession
As a first exercise, we isolate the variation in human capital driven by cyclical economic
conditions during youth, which should be plausibly orthogonal to the variation in the relative
demand for agricultural labor during adulthood. We use historical GDP data fromMaddison
(2003), which we filter using an HP filter. For each country and birth cohort, we compute
18Notice that these concerns are different (and, arguably, less severe) compared to those typically faced by
individual-level analyses of returns to education. In particular, individual-level selection in terms of omitted
characteristics is not problematic per se, as long as the cohort-level distribution of these characteristics does
not vary over time. Moreover, recall that cohort effects are estimated conditional on year effects, therefore
controlling for aggregate economic conditions.
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19 variables corresponding to the cyclical components of GDP per capita at birth, and at
ages 1 to 18. We then run, pooling together all countries, two separate regressions – one
for schooling sc,j, one for the cohort effects C˜c,j – on these 19 variables, controlling for
country-specific quadratic trends as in specification (6) and for country fixed effects.
Figures VIa and VIb show the point estimates of the effect of exposure to relatively
high GDP on schooling and cohort effects. Cohorts that have been exposed to relatively
favorable economic conditions while growing up spend more time in school and have – 15
years later or more – a lower agricultural employment share. Moreover, for both schooling
and cohort effects, the estimates are larger at the children’s ages when parents need to
decide whether to keep them in school. These results are consistent with the hypothesis
that children’s education is a normal good and that it shapes the comparative advantage
for non-agriculture.
While exposure to relatively high GDP during youth might affect human capital forma-
tion through mechanisms other than schooling, we run an IV specification to give a sense
of the magnitude of the implied causal relationship, if we are willing to assume one. We
estimate (6), pooled for all countries, using the cyclical components of GDP per capita
during youth as instruments for schooling. The results are reported in columns (3) and (4)
of Table II; the point estimates are similar to the OLS ones.19
4.3 Educational Reforms and Political Events
Next, we focus on the cross-cohort variation in educational attainment induced by the
timing of large country-wide shocks to the educational system. We compile a novel dataset
of educational reforms and political events for the countries in our sample. We find a
total of 33 policy reforms extending compulsory education, and 80 political events such
as independence from colonial powers, transitions to democracy and wars that plausibly
impacted (either positively or negatively) the working of the educational system or the costs
of acquiring education. We further use historical sources to identify educational reforms
that were either not fully implemented due to low state capacity, limited to some regions or
phased in slowly over time; 13 out of 33 reforms fall within this category (we refer to them
as “weakly-implemented”). Appendix C describes the details of the data construction.
Two examples. Figures VIIa and VIIb use data from two countries, France and Mozam-
bique, to illustrate the type of empirical variation that we use in this section. Both figures
show the evolution of the estimated cohort effects and schooling across the cohorts in our
sample; the vertical lines highlight the oldest cohort not yet in school when a reform or
19The number of observation declines slightly relative to columns (1) and (2), because we don’t have
available GDP data for all cohorts.
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political event takes place.
In France, the Zay Reform of 1936 increased compulsory education for all children to
the age of 14, and the Berthoin Edict of 1967 increased it further to the age of 16.20 Figure
VIIa shows trend breaks around the first cohorts affected by the reforms: while there is an
overall trend in schooling and agricultural employment across cohorts, individuals that were
not yet in school at the time the reform was implemented see a larger increase in schooling
and a larger decrease in cohort effects.
Mozambique fought an independence war from Portugal between 1964 and 1975. The
war disrupted the educational system, as confirmed by the stagnating educational attain-
ment for the cohorts of schooling age at that time. After independence, the Mozambique
Liberation Front led extensive programs for economic development, including free health-
care and education; this is reflected in the faster schooling growth for cohorts born after
1970. Figure VIIb shows that, as for the previous case, the estimated cohort effects mostly
mirror the schooling data.
Figure VII: Trend Breaks around Education Reforms and Political Events, Two Countries
(a) Schooling Reforms in France
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(b) Political Events in Mozambique
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Notes: the Figures plot the cohort effects C˜c,j estimated from specification (5) (left y-axis) and cohort
schooling sc,j for all available birth cohorts (right y-axis). The red vertical lines report the first birth
cohorts that are affected by the corresponding policy reform and political event.
All reforms and political events. We now apply a similar graphical analysis to the
whole sample. For each policy reform or political event r, we denote as c¯r the oldest cohort
not yet in school at that time. We then compute, for both cohort effects and schooling, the
20Of course, due to its timing, the effect of the Zay Reform might be confounded with the effect of World
War II. To alleviate this type of concerns, one of the specifications we present below includes decade of birth
dummies.
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difference between the annualized growth across the cohorts born in 10-year windows before
and after c¯r,
Ar ⌘ 1
10
⇣
C˜c¯r+10   C˜c¯r
⌘
  1
10
⇣
C˜c¯r 1   C˜c¯r 11
⌘
(7)
Sr ⌘ 1
10
(sc¯r+10   sc¯r) 
1
10
(sc¯r 1   sc¯r 11) (8)
and plot Ar and Sr against each other.21 Figures VIIIa and VIIIb show that when a reform
or political event was followed by a positive trend break in schooling – i.e. by a faster
increase in schooling for the affected cohorts – it was also followed by a negative trend
break in cohort effects. In other words, the negative comovement that we have shown in
Figure VII for two countries generalizes to the whole dataset.
Figure VIII: Trend Breaks around Education Reforms and Political Events, All Episodes
(a) Schooling Reforms
BOL 1969
GTM 1945
IND 1947
IND 1968JAM 1957
JAM 1966
MLI 1962
NPL 1981
PRT 1952
ROU 1969
RWA 1962
THA 1951
TTO 1956
AUT 1948
AUT 1962
BOL 1955
BRA 1934
BRA 1971CHL 1965 ECU 1983
ESP 5
ESP 1964
FRA 1936
FRA 1967
GRC 1976
PRT 1964
PRT 1973
PRT 1986
ROU 1948
ROU 1985
RWA 1977
SLV 1950
TUR 1973
-.06
-.04
-.02
0
.02
.04
.06
Re
lat
ive
 C
oh
or
t E
ffe
cts
 G
ro
wt
h,
 P
os
t R
ef
or
m
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Relative Schooling Increase, Post Reform
(b) Political Events
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Notes: the Figures plot the changes in the growth rate of cohort effects after a reform or political event,
Ar, against the corresponding changes for schooling, Sr, as defined in equations (7) and (8). The left
Figure shows the education policy reforms, while the right Figure shows the political events. On the left,
the gray diamonds identify the “weakly-implemented” reforms. On the right, the black triangles identify
independence from colonial rulers, the dark gray diamonds transitions to democracy, and the light gray
circles all other political events.
Figure VIIIa also highlights different patterns between fully-implemented and weakly-
implemented educational reforms. Most of the fully-implemented reforms lie on the bottom
21We consider a variant to this exercise in Figure A.IX, where we compute Ar and Sr as the differences
between the average annualized growth rates across all cohorts within the two 10-year windows; the results
are very similar.
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right quarter of the graph, meaning that they are associated with positive changes in school-
ing and negative changes in cohort effects; the pattern for the weakly-implemented reforms
(as well as for political events) is less clear: some of them are followed by positive and others
by negative trend breaks.22 In light of this, we next focus on the fully-implemented reforms
to quantify the impact of the associated schooling increase on the estimated cohort effects.
Figure IX: Event Study of Education Reforms on Agricultural Employment and Schooling
(a) Cohort Effects
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Notes: the left Figure shows the point estimates and 90% confidence intervals for Ix from specification (9).
The right Figure shows the point estimates for the same specification but using cohort effects on the left
hand side. The red line highlights the last cohort not affected by the policy reform.
An event study design. We implement an event study design around the first cohort
affected by the increase in compulsory education. For each policy reform r, we keep 10
cohorts older and 15 cohorts younger than c¯r. We detrend schooling and cohort effects using
the growth across the cohorts born in a 10-year window before c¯r, and then regress each
variable on a full set of dummies around c¯r. In particular, for schooling (and equivalently
for the cohort effects), we estimate
sˆc,r =  r +
15X
x= 10
I(c=c¯r+x) + "c,r (9)
where  r is a reform fixed effect, I(c=c¯r+x) is a dummy equal to 1 if cohort c is born x years
after c¯r and sˆc.r is detrended schooling, constructed as
sˆc,r = sc,r   c  c¯r + 10
10
(sc¯r 1   sc¯r 11) .
22To formalize these points, Figures A.X and A.XI compare the distributions of trend breaks around the
different types of reforms and political events with a placebo distribution of all the possible trend breaks in
our data. Only the fully-implemented reforms were followed by larger than average schooling increases.
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In Figures IXb and IXa, we report the point estimates for the dummies Ix. Consistently
with the previous graphical analysis, we observe an increase in schooling and a decrease
in cohort effects for cohorts born after c¯r. To have a sense of the implied magnitudes, we
estimate specification (6), pooled across countries for which we have at least one education
reform and using the dummies I(c=c¯r+x) to instrument for schooling around the policy re-
forms. The results are shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table II: the event study gives a
negative, significant and large relationship between schooling and cohort effects.
4.4 School Construction in Indonesia
Finally, we turn to one specific policy that provides us with quasi-experimental variation
in schooling. Following the seminal work of Duflo (2001), we study the effects of the INPRES
school construction program in Indonesia, which built 61,000 primary schools between 1974
and 1978. The identification exploits the facts that (i) the intensity of the program - as
measured by the number of new schools per pupil - varied across districts, and (ii) only
cohorts younger than 6 years old when the program started were fully exposed to it. We
run a difference-in-difference exercise, comparing cohorts fully exposed to the treatment to
those not exposed to it, in districts with higher and lower treatment intensity. The data –
the 1995 intercensal survey of Indonesia –, the identification strategy, and the specification
closely follow Duflo (2001). We refer the interested reader to that article for more details.
We restrict the sample to males born between 1950   1977. Consider the following
specification
yicd = ↵c + ⌘d +
1977X
k=1950
(Td ⇥ Iik)  k +
1977X
k=1950
(⇠d ⇥ Iik)'k + ✏ijd, (10)
where (i, c, d) is an individual i, born in cohort c and currently living in district d, ↵c is a
cohort fixed effect, ⌘d is a district fixed effect, Td is the number of schools built per 1000
children in district d, Ic is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i is born in cohort c, and ⇠d is
the school enrollment in 1972. The coefficients of interest are { c}1977c=1950, which capture the
effects of program intensity on each cohort. We estimate (10) for three different outcome
variables: (i) years of schooling, for our first stage; (ii) a dummy equal to 1 for agricultural
employment, for our reduced form specification; (iii) a dummy equal to 1 for non-agricultural
employment (non-employment being the residual category with respect to (ii) and (iii)).23
We report the estimated coefficients and associated standard errors in Figures Xa, Xb,
and Xc. The coefficients are normalized to average zero for the control cohorts, that should
23Karachiwalla and Palloni (2019) run a very similar specification using Indonesian data and include
further details on the empirical analysis. While we both reach the same specification independently, the
first version of our work was circulated in August 2017 (https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1ws4x2fg).
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have been at most marginally affected by the treatment. The figures suggest no differential
trend prior to the program.24 As expected, the effect of the program was positive on edu-
cation, negative on agricultural employment, and positive on non-agricultural employment.
Figure X: INPRES School Construction
(a) Point Estimates for Education
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(b) Point Estimates for Agriculture
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(c) Point Estimates for non-Agriculture
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Notes: Figure (a) shows the estimates of the cohort dummies from the first stage regression according
to specification (10) when the left hand side variable is years of schooling. Figures (b) and (c) show the
estimates for the reduce form results – from the same specification (10) – with either agricultural or non-
agricultural employment as left hand side variables. The red dotted vertical line separates the treatment
from the control cohorts. Data for agricultural employment and schooling are from the 1995 intercensal
survey of Indonesia (SUPAS); data for treatment intensity are from Duflo (2001).
As in the original paper, the cohort-specific coefficients are imprecisely estimated and
often not statistically different from each other. In order to improve power, we follow Duflo
(2001) and focus on the comparison of two cohorts: a treatment cohort of individuals that
were between 2 and 6 years old at the time the program was implemented, and a control
24When we omit the controls for enrollment in 1972, schooling years show a pre-trend. For this reason,
we keep the controls throughout our analysis.
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cohort of individuals that were between 12 and 17 years of age. The specification is the
same as in (10), but with only one treatment cohort, and thus one coefficient of interest:
the interaction between program intensity and the treatment cohort dummy.
Table III displays the results. Columns 1 and 2 show the reduced form specifications: the
program is associated with a significant decrease in the probability of agricultural employ-
ment and an increase in the probability of non-agricultural employment; the latter is larger
than the former, suggesting a significant flow from non-employment to non-agricultural em-
ployment as well. Column 3 reports the first stage specification: one extra school per 1000
children increases schooling by ⇠ 0.14, just as in Duflo (2001). Columns 4 and 5 show the
IV results, where years of schooling are instrumented by the interaction between treatment
intensity and the treated cohort dummy: one extra year of schooling reduces the probabil-
ity of agricultural employment by 6.3 percentage points, and increases the probability of
non-agricultural employment by 22.3 percentage points. This evidence shows that increases
in schooling across cohorts led to lower propensities to work in agriculture.25
Table III: School Construction and Sectoral Employment: Evidence from Indonesia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employed
in Agri
Employed
in Non-Agri
Years of
Schooling
Employed
in Agri
Employed
in Non-Agri
Treated Cohort ⇥ Intensity -0.009 0.031 0.137
(0.004) (0.005) (0.036)
Years of Schooling -0.063 0.223
(0.030) (0.063)
Cohort Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Method OLS OLS OLS IV IV
F Stat First Stage - - - 14.29 14.29
Observations 53154 53154 53154 53154 53154
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
4.5 Taking Stock
The results in this Section, based on different data sources and empirical approaches,
support an interpretation of cohort effects as changes in human capital. We have considered
several sources of cohort-level differences in educational attainment, both “demand-driven”
25The results of this exercise are not directly comparable to the ones in Table II, since here we are running
a linear probability model. In Appendix D, we run a cohort-level regression that allows us to compare the
two, and find similar magnitudes.
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(Section 4.2) and “policy-driven” (Sections 4.3 and 4.4); in both cases, they are reflected in
corresponding differences in agricultural employment, as captured by our cohort effects. The
policy results are particular noteworthy, as they suggest that, at the micro level, governments
can affect sectoral choices by increasing access to formal education. We now turn to a setup
that allows us to evaluate the implications of these results for structural transformation at
the aggregate level.
5 Model
This section develops a general equilibrium model of frictional labor reallocation out of
agriculture by cohort. The model provides a structural interpretation of the cohort and year
effects estimated in Section 3. Moreover, it gives us a framework to compute their aggregate
effects in general equilibrium.
5.1 Environment
We start by describing the economic environment. Time is discrete and runs infinitely.
Demographics, Preferences, and Individual Traits. The economy is inhabited by
N + 1 overlapping cohorts, indexed by c, each composed by a continuum of mass one of
workers. Individuals of cohort c enter the labor market at time c and then work for a total of
N +1 periods; therefore, they work each period in {c, ..., c+N}. They derive an increasing
and non-satiated utility from the consumption of an agricultural and a non-agricultural
good, and supply labor inelastically.
In each period, workers self-select in one of the two sectors of the economy, agricul-
ture and non-agriculture. In agriculture, all workers have identical productivity. In non-
agriculture, workers supply h (c, ") efficiency units, where h (c, ") depends on the birth cohort
c as well as on the individual-level (and time invariant) ability ". In particular, we assume
the Cobb-Douglas aggregator
h (c, ") = h c "
1  ,
where hc captures a non-agricultural productivity shifter specific to cohort c, and     0 is
a parameter controlling the relative weight of the cohort- and individual-level components.
In what follows, we refer to h (c, ") and hc as, respectively, individual-level and cohort-level
human capital; in Section 6.3 we consider an extension where h (c, ") reflects a combination
of human capital and preferences.26
26The assumption that non-agriculture is more human capital intensive than agriculture is consistent with
widely documented patterns of sorting of high-skilled workers in non-agriculture (e.g. Gollin et al. (2014),
Young (2013) Porzio (2017)), larger returns to skills in non-agriculture (see Herrendorf and Schoellman
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We assume that " is distributed according to a Beta(⌫, 1) distribution, where ⌫ is inversely
related to the within-cohort variability. This distributional assumption buys tractability by
allowing us to reconcile a constant rate of labor reallocation with time-varying sorting on
idiosyncratic characteristics, as we show below. Moreover, we assume that hc grows across
cohorts at a constant rate, as summarized by Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. Cohort-level human capital increases across cohorts at a constant rate
log
hc+1
hc
= log gh > 0 8 c
We define the aggregate stock of human capital at time t as
Ht =
tX
c=t N
ˆ
h (c, ") dF (")
From the expression for h(c, ") and Assumption 1, it follows that Ht grows over time at a
constant rate, with log Ht+1Ht =   log gh > 0 for any t.
Production. We index the agricultural sector by A and the non-agricultural sector by
M . The production of the agricultural good requires land X and the labor input LA,t,
while the production of the non-agricultural good only requires the labor input LM,t. We
assume that land is owned collectively by all individuals, who share the profits and use them
to finance consumption. Productivity in agriculture, ZA,t, may differ from productivity in
non-agriculture, ZM,t. The relative price of agricultural goods in equilibrium is given by pt,
which we describe below. The revenue functions in agriculture and non-agriculture are
ptYA,t = ptZA,tX
↵L1 ↵A,t
YM,t = ZM,tLM,t.
We assume that individuals of different cohorts are perfect substitutes in both sectors.
However, as discussed above, the efficiency units supplied to the non-agricultural sector are
heterogeneous both across and within cohorts. Letting !t (c, ") be the occupational choice
function, taking value 1 if individual (c, ") at time t works in agriculture and 0 otherwise,
the agricultural and non-agricultural labor inputs are given by
LA,t =
tX
c=t N
ˆ
!t (c, ") dF (")
(2018)) and skill-specific mobility across sectors (see Hicks et al. (2017)).
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and
LM,t =
tX
c=t N
ˆ
h (c, ") (1  !t (c, ")) dF (") ,
where F (") is the within-cohort distribution of ".
Firms choose optimally how many workers to hire, and the labor market is competitive.
As a result, workers are paid the marginal product of their labor: the individual-level
earnings in the two sectors are given by
yA,t = wA,t = (1  ↵) ptZA,tX↵L ↵A,t
yM,t (c, ") = wM,th (c, ") = ZM,th (c, ") . (11)
where wA,t and wM,t denote wages per efficiency unit in agriculture and non-agriculture.
Sectoral Choice. We now analyze the worker’s sectoral choice problem. Given that
markets are complete and that there is perfect foresight, we can think of individual (c, ")
choosing at time c a sequence of occupations {!t}N+ct=c , one for each period in her life. This
choice is made taking as given the path of her incomes in agriculture – {yA,t}N+ct=c – and
non-agriculture – {yM,t (c, ")}N+ct=c , as defined above. Moreover, sectoral changes are asso-
ciated with a cost C (!t 1,!t, yA,t, yM,t (c, ")), discussed in greater detail below. Formally,
individual (c, ") solves
max
{!t}c+Nt=c
c+NX
t=c
 t c
 
!tyA,t + (1  !t) yM,t (c, ")   C (!t 1,!t, yA,t, yM,t (c, "))
!
s.t. !c 1 = 1;
where we are assuming that all individuals are born in agriculture, hence the constraint
!c 1 = 1. The mobility friction takes the following form
C (!t 1,!t, yA,t, yM,t (c, ")) = I (!t = 0)iyM,t (c, ")+I (!t < !t 1) fyM,t (c, ")+I (!t > !t 1) fyA,t
and includes (i) an iceberg cost that reduces the non-agricultural wage by a fraction i in
each period, and (ii) a fixed cost that reduces the wage in the destination sector by a fraction
f in periods when a change of sector takes place. The iceberg cost can be interpreted as
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an amenity cost – as in Lagakos et al. (2019) – or as any other flow cost associated with
leaving the agricultural sector, as, for example, the exclusion from risk-sharing communities
(Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016; Morten, 2019). The fixed cost can be interpreted as a one-
time mobility cost, which might be driven by actual moving expenses (if a geographical
move is necessary to change sector) or any other associated cost, such as retraining, idle
time in between jobs, or one-time emotional costs.27
Notice that we have assumed that the mobility costs are constant over time and across
cohorts. Moreover, we assume that they are bounded above by i¯ and f¯ , which are explicit
functions of the parameters (included in the Appendix). This assumption guarantees that
at least some workers reallocate out of agriculture. We discuss further its role for the
identification and the interpretation of the results below.
Assumption 2. Mobility frictions are constant over time, across cohorts, and across in-
dividuals within cohorts. Moreover, i 2 [0, i¯] and f 2 ⇥0, f¯⇤.
Closing the Model: the Price of Agricultural Goods. To close the model, we would
need to describe how the goods’ market clears. This would require taking a stand on pref-
erences, the degree of openness of the economy, and the relative world prices of agricultural
and non-agricultural goods. As we illustrate below, this is not needed for the purpose of
mapping the decomposition exercise of Section 3 into the model. We therefore postulate a
log-linear functional form for the relative agricultural price, which can be interpreted as a
log-linear approximation of a fully specified model. Specifically, we assume
log pt| {z }
Agr Price
= ⌘|{z}
Elasticity
0@ log ✓t| {z }
Demand
  ⌘z log zt| {z }
Supply
  ⌘L logLA,t| {z }
Agr Labor
+ ⌘H logHt| {z }
Human Capital
1A , (12)
where log ✓t is a demand shifter that captures the relative demand for agricultural goods,
log zt is relative agricultural productivity, zt ⌘ ZA,tZM,t , LA,t is agricultural labor and Ht is the
aggregate human capital stock. The parameters ⌘, ⌘z, ⌘L, and ⌘H modulate the role of each
variable in determining the agricultural price. In particular, ⌘ = 0 corresponds to the case
of a small open economy with no trade frictions – i.e. an economy that takes the prices
of agricultural and non-agricultural goods as given (we refer to this case as simply “small
open economy”). On the contrary, with ⌘ > 0 an increase in the relative demand increases
the relative price, while an increase in the relative supply - either due to an increase in
27A small complication arises for the “initial old” born at time 0, which, in absence of any adjustment,
would effectively be more impacted by the fixed cost given their shorter life span. To keep the sectoral
choice problem symmetric across all cohorts, we assume that the affected “initial old” (i.e. those that would
have moved to non-agriculture at a younger age if they had a normal life span) are born in non-agriculture,
i.e. their fixed cost is waived (or, equivalently, financed by the other cohorts through lump sum taxes). See
Appendix E for more details.
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agricultural productivity or employment - should decrease the relative price; that is, ⌘z and
⌘L are likely to be positive. An increase in Ht should instead have two opposing effects on
the agricultural price: (i) an income effect due to individuals becoming richer, decreasing
the relative demand and the relative price of agricultural goods, and (ii) an increase in
relative agricultural labor productivity, possibly increasing the relative price. The sign of
⌘H is thus a priori ambiguous.
This approach preserves tractability while encompassing, in reduced form, the main
mechanisms suggested in the literature as possible drivers of structural change. On one hand,
a decrease in the demand for agricultural goods over time, as in Kongsamut et al. (2001)
and Comin et al. (2015), decreases pt leading to reallocation of labor out of agriculture.
On the other hand, the effect of an increase in relative agricultural productivity depends
on openness to trade: if the economy is sufficiently closed – i.e. if ⌘ is large enough – an
increase in zt lowers pt enough to push workers out of agriculture, as in Ngai and Pissarides
(2007); if the economy is sufficiently close to a small open economy – i.e. if ⌘ is small – a
higher zt pushes workers into agriculture, as in Matsuyama (1992a).
We impose the following restrictions on the exogenous determinants of the demand for
agricultural labor, ✓t and zt. First, we assume that they change at constant rates, g✓ and gz.
Second, we require that these rates are not too large, as stated in the following assumption.
Assumption 3. The demand shifter ✓t and relative productivity zt change at constant
rates g✓ and gz such that
log g✓z ⌘ ⌘ log g✓ + (1  ⌘⌘z) log gz  max {0,  log gh} ,
where  ⌘ v (↵+⌘⌘L)+(1  )⌘⌘H(1  ) .
As we show below, the key role of this assumption is to guarantee that the year compo-
nent implied by the model is negative, consistently with the empirical evidence in Section
3. This is achieved by ensuring that the decline over time in the relative demand for agri-
cultural labor is large enough, taking into account the general equilibrium effects of human
capital growth on relative prices.
5.2 Reallocation by Cohort
We now start the equilibrium characterization by describing the cohort-level reallocation
out of agriculture. We focus on a constant reallocation path, i.e. an equilibrium where labor
reallocates from agriculture to non-agriculture at a constant rate, as formally defined below.
Definition: Constant Reallocation Path. A constant reallocation path is given by a se-
ries {LA,t, wA,t, wM,t (c, ") ,!t (c, ") for all c 2 [t N, t]}1t=0, such that, given paths for agri-
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cultural demand, sectoral productivities, and cohort-level human capital {✓t, ZA,t, ZM,t, ht}1t=0,
firms maximize profits taking wages as given, individuals choose optimally their occupation
at each point in time taking wages as given, the labor market clears in both agriculture and
non-agriculture, and agricultural employment decreases at a constant rate, gLA ⌘ LA,t+1LA,t < 1.
Frictionless Reallocation by Cohort. To build intuition, we start from the frictionless
case – i.e. i = 0 and f = 0. If moving is costless, individuals simply choose the sector that
gives them the highest income in every period. The occupational choice is given by
!t (c, ") =
8<:1 if wM,th (c, ")  wA,t0 otherwise
which generates a cut-off rule such that individual (c, ") moves out of agriculture at time t
if her ability is higher than a threshold "ˆt (c), where
"ˆt (c) =

wA,t
wM,t
h  c
  1
1  
.
Individuals sort into the sector where they have a comparative advantage. Using the ex-
pression for h (c, "), we can see that there is sorting both within and across cohorts. Within
any cohort, individuals with high " move out of agriculture. Across cohorts, the younger
ones, with a higher cohort-level human capital hc, have a larger share of individuals out of
agriculture.
The share of workers from cohort c in agriculture is equal to
lA,t,c = F ("ˆt (c)) =

wA,t
wM,t
h  c
  v
1  
, (13)
and the reallocation out of agriculture for a given cohort - after substituting for the equi-
librium wages and the law of motion of pt - is given by
log lA,t+1,c   log lA,t,c = v
1    (log g✓z + ⌘⌘H  log gh   (⌘⌘L + ↵) log gLA) , (14)
where log gLA ⌘ logLA,t+1  logLA,t. Equation (14) shows that the rate of labor reallocation
for a given cohort is constant over time. Last, we notice that the agricultural employment
gap between cohort c and cohort c+ 1 at time t,
log lA,t,c+1   log lA,t,c = log
✓
hc+1
hc
◆   v1  
=    v
1    log gh,
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is proportional to the rate of growth in human capital across cohorts: at a given point in
time, the larger the human capital gap between young and old workers, the less likely the
young are to be in agriculture relatively to the old.
Frictional Reallocation by Cohort. Next, we discuss the role of mobility frictions. The
iceberg cost i represents a constant wedge between agricultural and non-agricultural wages;
as such, it reduces the level of non-agricultural employment at each point in time, but it
does not affect the rate of labor reallocation. The fixed cost f is more consequential, since it
prevents some cohorts, but not others, from reallocating. Consider relatively young workers
employed in agriculture at time t: given that the fixed cost is discounted over the whole
working life, those with highest ability among them will still find it worthwhile to switch
sector and take advantage of the ever-increasing relative demand for non-agricultural labor.
In fact, the rate at which they reallocate is the same as in the frictionless case, even though
the frictions do increase the level of agricultural employment. However, workers that are
still in agriculture when old may be trapped there by the fixed cost, given that even those
with the highest ability among them might not be willing to switch sector with only a few
periods left to work. As a result, at a given point in time older workers are more likely to
be in agriculture than younger ones, over and above what is implied by the human capital
gap between the two generations. We formalize these results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: Labor Reallocation by Cohort with Mobility Frictions
Let at(c) = t c be the age of cohort c at time t. There exists a threshold aˆ, with 1  aˆ < N ,
such that for any c and t
log lA,t+1,c   log lA,t,c =
8<: v1   (log g✓z + ⌘⌘H  log gh   (⌘⌘L + ↵) log gLA) if at+1(c)  aˆ0 if at+1(c) > aˆ
log lA,t,c+1   log lA,t,c =
8<:   v1   log gh, if at(c)  aˆ   v1   log gh   [at(c)  at(c+ 1)]⇤ if at(c) > aˆ
where ⇤   0.
Proof. See Appendix.  
The fixed cost divides cohorts into two groups, according to a time-invariant age thresh-
old. We refer to cohorts younger than aˆ as “unconstrained”, and to cohorts older than aˆ
as “constrained”. Notice that the youngest cohort is always unconstrained for the first two
periods, as aˆ   1: this is guaranteed by Assumption 2, which requires the fixed cost f to be
no greater than the value f¯ that would make the marginal mover of the one-year old cohort
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indifferent between reallocating out of agriculture or not.28
5.3 Aggregate Labor Reallocation
Aggregating up cohort-level agricultural employment, we can write the overall agricul-
tural labor supply at time t as
logLA,t =  S   ⌫
1    logHt +
⌫
1    log
wA,t
wM,t
(St)
where  S is a time-invariant term.29 The supply is upward sloping with respect to the relative
wage, as a higher relative wage induces more individuals to stay in agriculture. Moreover,
increases in human capital lead to a downward shift of the agricultural labor supply, as
human capital is more valued outside of agriculture. It is noteworthy that mobility frictions
are subsumed into the  S term, and as such do not affect the slope or the magnitude of the
shift associated with changes in Ht over time.
In equilibrium, agricultural employment is given by the intersection between (St) and
agricultural labor demand, which, combining (11) and (12), can be written as
logLA,t =  D+
⌘
↵ + ⌘⌘L
log ✓t+
(1  ⌘⌘z)
↵ + ⌘⌘L
log zt+
⌘⌘H
↵ + ⌘⌘L
logHt  1
↵ + ⌘⌘L
log
wA,t
wM,t
(Dt)
Figure XIa plots (St) and (Dt) in a supply-demand diagram, and illustrates the forces
driving labor reallocation between two generic times t and t + 1. First, the model features
the two main mechanisms behind structural change commonly emphasized in the literature,
i.e. a decrease in the relative demand for agricultural goods (✓t) and an increase in relative
agricultural productivity (zt), which - given Assumption 3 - shift downwards the relative
demand for agricultural labor. Second, the increase inHt over time time leads to a downward
shift in the relative supply curve, and possibly - as discussed below - an additional shift of
the demand curve through general equilibrium effects. The combination of these demand
and supply shifts leads to labor reallocation out of agriculture.
To isolate the role of human capital, Figure XIb displays a counterfactual scenario where
the demand forces behind labor reallocation are kept fixed, i.e. log g✓ = log gz = 0. As
discussed above, the fact that log gh > 0 implies that the supply curve shifts downwards. In
partial equilibrium, i.e. if the relative wage and price are constant, this shift would result
28As we show in the Appendix, aˆ is decreasing in f , which implies that the youngest cohort will be
unconstrained as long as ƒ is not larger than f¯ . The role on the upper bound on i imposed by Assumption 2
is instead to ensure that within all cohorts a positive mass of individuals is willing to move out of agriculture.
29In the frictionless case, this expression can be obtained by summing (13) across cohorts and using the
fact that Ht / h t . We provide the expression for  S in the general case with frictions in Appendix E.
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at t + 1 in a level of agricultural employment of LPEA,t+1. When wages are allowed to adjust
but prices are kept fixed - the case of a small open economy - the resulting agricultural
employment is LSOEA,t+1, which is larger than LPEA,t+1 since the adjustment in relative wages
attenuates the employment effect of the supply shift. Finally, if the relative price of the
agricultural good adjusts as well (i.e. if ⌘ > 0, as in a closed economy), the increase in
Ht leads additionally to a downward or upward shift in the demand curve, depending on
the sign of ⌘H . The resulting agricultural employment LCEA,t+1 can be higher or lower than
LSOEA,t+1, and can in principle even be higher than Lt: if the price elasticity is high enough, a
decrease in the supply of agricultural labor could increase the relative price sufficiently to
pull workers into agriculture.30 Figure XIb shows the case where LCEA,t+1 is in between LSOEA,t+1
and Lt.
Figure XI: Aggregate Labor Reallocation: Graphical Illustration
(a) Overall Reallocation
St
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<latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNR Dx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJMM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0 SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzNXfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB 8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNR Dx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJMM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0 SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzNXfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB 8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNR Dx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJMM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0 SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzNXfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB 8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNR Dx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJMM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0 SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzNXfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB 8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit>
logLA
<latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxt vgk=">AAAB8XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgy YWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHTaNSTWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPyw Y4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fUVSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRi QU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/dRn2lKLB87golm7lZE hlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA </latexit><latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxt vgk=">AAAB8XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgy YWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHTaNSTWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPyw Y4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fUVSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRi QU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/dRn2lKLB87golm7lZE hlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA </latexit><latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxt vgk=">AAAB8XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgy YWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHTaNSTWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPyw Y4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fUVSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRi QU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/dRn2lKLB87golm7lZE hlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA </latexit><latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxt vgk=">AAAB8XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgy YWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHTaNSTWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPyw Y4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fUVSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRi QU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/dRn2lKLB87golm7lZE hlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA </latexit>
log
wA
wM
<latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEmYlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3b bSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKCbKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEmYlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3b bSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKCbKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEmYlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3b bSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKCbKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEmYlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3b bSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKCbKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit>
logLA,t
<latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3 yUA=">AAAB83icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKz TxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN0tb2zu7e+X9g6aJU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq 0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+cvvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wj qWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZkGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlh byVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1Jc kTQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3 yUA=">AAAB83icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKz TxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN0tb2zu7e+X9g6aJU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq 0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+cvvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wj qWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZkGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlh byVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1Jc kTQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3 yUA=">AAAB83icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKz TxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN0tb2zu7e+X9g6aJU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq 0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+cvvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wj qWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZkGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlh byVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1Jc kTQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3 yUA=">AAAB83icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKz TxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN0tb2zu7e+X9g6aJU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq 0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+cvvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wj qWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZkGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlh byVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1Jc kTQ=</latexit>
log
wA,t
wM,t
<latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGX VTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZCTMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIe bHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nf f2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGX VTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZCTMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIe bHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nf f2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGX VTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZCTMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIe bHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nf f2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGX VTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZCTMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIe bHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nf f2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit>
logLA,t+1
<latexit sha1_base64="R3oR/hQCsnPmhpXd9kqM4oUi NdI=">AAAB9XicbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBAEJeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJGuYncwmQ2Z3lpleJSz5Dy8eFPHqv3jzb5w8Dp pY0FBUddPdFSRSGHTdb2dhcWl5ZTW3ll/f2NzaLuzs1oxKNeNVpqTSjYAaLkXMqyhQ8kaiOY0CyetB/3rk1x+5NkLF9 zhIuB/RbixCwSha6aElVZfctrPLEzz2hu1C0S25Y5B54k1JEaaotAtfrY5iacRjZJIa0/TcBP2MahRM8mG+lRqeUNanX d60NKYRN342vnpIDq3SIaHStmIkY/X3REYjYwZRYDsjij0z643E/7xmiuGFn4k4SZHHbLIoTCVBRUYRkI7QnKEcWEKZ FvZWwnpUU4Y2qLwNwZt9eZ7UTkueW/Luzorlq2kcOdiHAzgCD86hDDdQgSow0PAMr/DmPDkvzrvzMWldcKYze/AHzucP L+KRpA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="R3oR/hQCsnPmhpXd9kqM4oUi NdI=">AAAB9XicbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBAEJeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJGuYncwmQ2Z3lpleJSz5Dy8eFPHqv3jzb5w8Dp pY0FBUddPdFSRSGHTdb2dhcWl5ZTW3ll/f2NzaLuzs1oxKNeNVpqTSjYAaLkXMqyhQ8kaiOY0CyetB/3rk1x+5NkLF9 zhIuB/RbixCwSha6aElVZfctrPLEzz2hu1C0S25Y5B54k1JEaaotAtfrY5iacRjZJIa0/TcBP2MahRM8mG+lRqeUNanX d60NKYRN342vnpIDq3SIaHStmIkY/X3REYjYwZRYDsjij0z643E/7xmiuGFn4k4SZHHbLIoTCVBRUYRkI7QnKEcWEKZ FvZWwnpUU4Y2qLwNwZt9eZ7UTkueW/Luzorlq2kcOdiHAzgCD86hDDdQgSow0PAMr/DmPDkvzrvzMWldcKYze/AHzucP L+KRpA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="R3oR/hQCsnPmhpXd9kqM4oUi NdI=">AAAB9XicbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBAEJeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJGuYncwmQ2Z3lpleJSz5Dy8eFPHqv3jzb5w8Dp pY0FBUddPdFSRSGHTdb2dhcWl5ZTW3ll/f2NzaLuzs1oxKNeNVpqTSjYAaLkXMqyhQ8kaiOY0CyetB/3rk1x+5NkLF9 zhIuB/RbixCwSha6aElVZfctrPLEzz2hu1C0S25Y5B54k1JEaaotAtfrY5iacRjZJIa0/TcBP2MahRM8mG+lRqeUNanX d60NKYRN342vnpIDq3SIaHStmIkY/X3REYjYwZRYDsjij0z643E/7xmiuGFn4k4SZHHbLIoTCVBRUYRkI7QnKEcWEKZ FvZWwnpUU4Y2qLwNwZt9eZ7UTkueW/Luzorlq2kcOdiHAzgCD86hDDdQgSow0PAMr/DmPDkvzrvzMWldcKYze/AHzucP L+KRpA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="R3oR/hQCsnPmhpXd9kqM4oUi NdI=">AAAB9XicbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBAEJeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJGuYncwmQ2Z3lpleJSz5Dy8eFPHqv3jzb5w8Dp pY0FBUddPdFSRSGHTdb2dhcWl5ZTW3ll/f2NzaLuzs1oxKNeNVpqTSjYAaLkXMqyhQ8kaiOY0CyetB/3rk1x+5NkLF9 zhIuB/RbixCwSha6aElVZfctrPLEzz2hu1C0S25Y5B54k1JEaaotAtfrY5iacRjZJIa0/TcBP2MahRM8mG+lRqeUNanX d60NKYRN342vnpIDq3SIaHStmIkY/X3REYjYwZRYDsjij0z643E/7xmiuGFn4k4SZHHbLIoTCVBRUYRkI7QnKEcWEKZ FvZWwnpUU4Y2qLwNwZt9eZ7UTkueW/Luzorlq2kcOdiHAzgCD86hDDdQgSow0PAMr/DmPDkvzrvzMWldcKYze/AHzucP L+KRpA==</latexit>
St+1
<latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W vXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwOxFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8SpZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvm rN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalkIyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7q ABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W vXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwOxFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8SpZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvm rN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalkIyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7q ABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W vXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwOxFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8SpZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvm rN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalkIyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7q ABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W vXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwOxFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8SpZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvm rN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalkIyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7q ABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit>
Dt+1
<latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W 9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLROnmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uW v3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWwrJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uI cGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W 9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLROnmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uW v3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWwrJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uI cGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W 9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLROnmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uW v3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWwrJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uI cGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W 9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLROnmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uW v3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWwrJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uI cGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit>
(b) Counterfactual: log g✓ = log gz = 0
St
<latexit sha1_base64="eiJgLuhnjbZcfbhdiiSjHR5HLgQ=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8eKpi20oWy2m3bpZhN2J0IJ/Q1ePCji1R/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0HW/ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqmST TjPsskYnuhNRwKRT3UaDknVRzGoeSt8Px7cxvP3FtRKIecZLyIKZDJSLBKFrJf+jnOO1Xa27dnYOsEq8gNSjQ7Fe/eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNKLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKzqwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtF1kAuVZsgVWyyKMkkwIbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT8WG4C2/vEpaF3XPrXv3l7XGTRFHGU7gFM7BgytowB00wQcGAp7hFd4c5bw4787HorXkFDPH8AfO5w/9bY7K</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eiJgLuhnjbZcfbhdiiSjHR5HLgQ=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8eKpi20oWy2m3bpZhN2J0IJ/Q1ePCji1R/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0HW/ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqmST TjPsskYnuhNRwKRT3UaDknVRzGoeSt8Px7cxvP3FtRKIecZLyIKZDJSLBKFrJf+jnOO1Xa27dnYOsEq8gNSjQ7Fe/eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNKLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKzqwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtF1kAuVZsgVWyyKMkkwIbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT8WG4C2/vEpaF3XPrXv3l7XGTRFHGU7gFM7BgytowB00wQcGAp7hFd4c5bw4787HorXkFDPH8AfO5w/9bY7K</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eiJgLuhnjbZcfbhdiiSjHR5HLgQ=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8eKpi20oWy2m3bpZhN2J0IJ/Q1ePCji1R/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0HW/ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqmST TjPsskYnuhNRwKRT3UaDknVRzGoeSt8Px7cxvP3FtRKIecZLyIKZDJSLBKFrJf+jnOO1Xa27dnYOsEq8gNSjQ7Fe/eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNKLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKzqwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtF1kAuVZsgVWyyKMkkwIbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT8WG4C2/vEpaF3XPrXv3l7XGTRFHGU7gFM7BgytowB00wQcGAp7hFd4c5bw4787HorXkFDPH8AfO5w/9bY7K</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eiJgLuhnjbZcfbhdiiSjHR5HLgQ=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8eKpi20oWy2m3bpZhN2J0IJ/Q1ePCji1R/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0HW/ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqmST TjPsskYnuhNRwKRT3UaDknVRzGoeSt8Px7cxvP3FtRKIecZLyIKZDJSLBKFrJf+jnOO1Xa27dnYOsEq8gNSjQ7Fe/eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNKLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKzqwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtF1kAuVZsgVWyyKMkkwIbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT8WG4C2/vEpaF3XPrXv3l7XGTRFHGU7gFM7BgytowB00wQcGAp7hFd4c5bw4787HorXkFDPH8AfO5w/9bY7K</latexit>
Dt
<latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNRDx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJ MM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzNXfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNRDx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJ MM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzNXfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNRDx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJ MM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzNXfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNRDx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03YnQgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJ MM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzNXfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit>
logLA
<latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxtvgk=">AAAB8XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgyYWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHTaN STWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPywY4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fUVSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRiQU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/dRn2lKLB87golm7lZEhlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxtvgk=">AAAB8XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgyYWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHTaN STWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPywY4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fUVSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRiQU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/dRn2lKLB87golm7lZEhlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxtvgk=">AAAB8XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgyYWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHTaN STWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPywY4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fUVSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRiQU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/dRn2lKLB87golm7lZEhlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxtvgk=">AAAB8XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgyYWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHTaN STWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPywY4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fUVSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRiQU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/dRn2lKLB87golm7lZEhlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA</latexit>
log
wA
wM
<latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEmYlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3b bSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKCbKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEmYlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3b bSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKCbKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEmYlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3b bSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKCbKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEmYlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3b bSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKCbKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit>
logLA,t
<latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3yUA=">AAAB83icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKzTxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN0tb2zu7e+X9g6a JU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+cvvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wjqWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZkGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlhbyVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1JckTQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3yUA=">AAAB83icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKzTxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN0tb2zu7e+X9g6a JU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+cvvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wjqWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZkGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlhbyVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1JckTQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3yUA=">AAAB83icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKzTxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN0tb2zu7e+X9g6a JU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+cvvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wjqWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZkGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlhbyVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1JckTQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3yUA=">AAAB83icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKzTxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN0tb2zu7e+X9g6a JU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+cvvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wjqWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZkGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlhbyVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1JckTQ=</latexit>
log
wA,t
wM,t
<latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGXVTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZCTMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK 3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIebHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nff2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGXVTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZCTMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK 3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIebHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nff2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGXVTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZCTMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK 3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIebHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nff2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGXVTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZCTMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK 3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIebHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nff2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit>
St+1
<latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0WvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwOxFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8S pZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvmrN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalkIyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7qABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0WvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwOxFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8S pZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvmrN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalkIyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7qABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0WvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwOxFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8S pZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvmrN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalkIyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7qABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0WvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwOxFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8S pZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvmrN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalkIyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7qABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit>
Dt+1
<latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLRO nmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uWv3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWwrJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uIcGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLRO nmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uWv3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWwrJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uIcGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLRO nmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uWv3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWwrJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uIcGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLRO nmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uWv3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWwrJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uIcGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit>
logLPEA,t+1
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Proposition 1 characterizes the overall rate of labor reallocation on a constant realloca-
tion path. As illustrated above, labor reallocation out of agriculture (log gLA < 0) can be
triggered by demand forces (log g✓z < 0) and human capital growth (log gh > 0). The direct
effect of each term is mediated by the within-cohort ability distribution - which determines
the mass of workers leaving agriculture for a given change in relative wages - and by general
equilibrium effects. The impact of demand forces is unambiguous, since ⇥D 2
⇥
0, 1
 
. The
effect of human capital growth can be amplified or attenuated by general equilibrium forces;
in a small open economy ⇥S = ⇥D 2
⇥
0, 1
 
, while in a closed economy ⇥S can be positive or
negative depending on the parameters’ values. We refer to 1 ⇥S as the general equilibrium
30This result is reminiscent of Matsuyama (1992b), which shows that agricultural productivity growth has
opposite implications on agricultural employment in a closed and open economy. The same is potentially
true for changes in human capital; however, for those to increase agricultural employment, it needs to be
the case that both the economy is sufficiently closed (⌘ > 0) and the productivity effect of human capital
on prices dominates the income effect (⌘H > 0).
32
multiplier of human capital growth. Mobility frictions are irrelevant for the aggregate rate
of labor reallocation, even though they do affect the level of agricultural employment at
each point in time.31
Proposition 1: Aggregate Labor Reallocation
Labor reallocation out of agriculture is given by
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Figure XII: Cohort and Year Components in the Model
St
<latexit sha1_base64="eiJgLuhnjbZcfbhdiiSjHR5HLgQ=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8eKpi20oWy2m3bpZhN2J 0IJ/Q1ePCji1R/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0HW/ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqmSTTjPsskYnuhNRwKRT3UaDknVRzGoeSt8Px7cxvP3FtRKIecZLyIKZDJSLBKFrJf+jnOO1Xa27dnYOsEq8gNSjQ7Fe/eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNKLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKzqwyIFGibSkkc/ X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtF1kAuVZsgVWyyKMkkwIbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT8WG4C2/vEpaF3XPrXv3l7XGTRFHGU7gFM7BgytowB00wQcGAp7hFd4c5bw4787HorXkFDPH8AfO5w/9bY7K</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eiJgLuhnjbZcfbhdiiSjHR5HLgQ=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8eKpi20oWy2m3bpZhN2J 0IJ/Q1ePCji1R/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0HW/ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqmSTTjPsskYnuhNRwKRT3UaDknVRzGoeSt8Px7cxvP3FtRKIecZLyIKZDJSLBKFrJf+jnOO1Xa27dnYOsEq8gNSjQ7Fe/eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNKLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKzqwyIFGibSkkc/ X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtF1kAuVZsgVWyyKMkkwIbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT8WG4C2/vEpaF3XPrXv3l7XGTRFHGU7gFM7BgytowB00wQcGAp7hFd4c5bw4787HorXkFDPH8AfO5w/9bY7K</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eiJgLuhnjbZcfbhdiiSjHR5HLgQ=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8eKpi20oWy2m3bpZhN2J 0IJ/Q1ePCji1R/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0HW/ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqmSTTjPsskYnuhNRwKRT3UaDknVRzGoeSt8Px7cxvP3FtRKIecZLyIKZDJSLBKFrJf+jnOO1Xa27dnYOsEq8gNSjQ7Fe/eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNKLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKzqwyIFGibSkkc/ X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtF1kAuVZsgVWyyKMkkwIbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT8WG4C2/vEpaF3XPrXv3l7XGTRFHGU7gFM7BgytowB00wQcGAp7hFd4c5bw4787HorXkFDPH8AfO5w/9bY7K</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eiJgLuhnjbZcfbhdiiSjHR5HLgQ=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8eKpi20oWy2m3bpZhN2J 0IJ/Q1ePCji1R/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZemEph0HW/ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqmSTTjPsskYnuhNRwKRT3UaDknVRzGoeSt8Px7cxvP3FtRKIecZLyIKZDJSLBKFrJf+jnOO1Xa27dnYOsEq8gNSjQ7Fe/eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNKLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKzqwyIFGibSkkc/ X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtF1kAuVZsgVWyyKMkkwIbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT8WG4C2/vEpaF3XPrXv3l7XGTRFHGU7gFM7BgytowB00wQcGAp7hFd4c5bw4787HorXkFDPH8AfO5w/9bY7K</latexit>
Dt
<latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNRDx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03Yn Qgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJMM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzN XfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNRDx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03Yn Qgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJMM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzN XfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNRDx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03Yn Qgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJMM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzN XfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="SgvBs4ciER2RnvdRPxGSOsh9Sh0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GNRDx4rmLbQhrLZbtqlm03Yn Qgl9Dd48aCIV3+QN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5YSqFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCoZZJMM+6zRCa6E1LDpVDcR4GSd1LNaRxK3g7HtzO//cS1EYl6xEnKg5gOlYgEo2gl/66f47Rfrbl1dw6ySryC1KBAs1/96g0SlsVcIZPUmK7nphjkVKNgkk8rvczwlLIxHfKupYrG3AT5/NgpObPKgESJtqWQzN XfEzmNjZnEoe2MKY7MsjcT//O6GUbXQS5UmiFXbLEoyiTBhMw+JwOhOUM5sYQyLeythI2opgxtPhUbgrf88ippXdQ9t+49XNYaN0UcZTiBUzgHD66gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9aSU8wcwx84nz/mdY67</latexit>
logLA
<latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxtvgk=">AAAB8 XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgyYWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhul ra2d3b3yvsHTaNSTWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPywY4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fU VSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRiQU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/d Rn2lKLB87golm7lZEhlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA</l atexit><latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxtvgk=">AAAB8 XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgyYWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhul ra2d3b3yvsHTaNSTWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPywY4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fU VSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRiQU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/d Rn2lKLB87golm7lZEhlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA</l atexit><latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxtvgk=">AAAB8 XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgyYWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhul ra2d3b3yvsHTaNSTWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPywY4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fU VSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRiQU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/d Rn2lKLB87golm7lZEhlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA</l atexit><latexit sha1_base64="043goxOALdQpe2Q3uY+FOpxtvgk=">AAAB8 XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJkuYncwmQ+axzMwKYclfePGgiFf/xpt/4yTZgyYWNBRV3XR3RQlnxvr+t1dYWV1b3yhul ra2d3b3yvsHTaNSTWiDKK50O8KGciZpwzLLaTvRFIuI01Y0upn6rSeqDVPywY4TGgo8kCxmBFsnPXa5GqC7XnY16ZUrftWfAS2TICcVyFHvlb+6fU VSQaUlHBvTCfzEhhnWlhFOJ6VuamiCyQgPaMdRiQU1YTa7eIJOnNJHsdKupEUz9fdEhoUxYxG5ToHt0Cx6U/E/r5Pa+DLMmExSSyWZL4pTjqxC0/d Rn2lKLB87golm7lZEhlhjYl1IJRdCsPjyMmmeVQO/GtyfV2rXeRxFOIJjOIUALqAGt1CHBhCQ8Ayv8OYZ78V79z7mrQUvnzmEP/A+fwAOyZCA</l atexit>
log
wA
wM
<latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEm YlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3bbSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKC bKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEm YlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3bbSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKC bKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEm YlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3bbSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKC bKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jcX4D93Q5XoJ0LjEjIcJ/sJHfkA=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdSO4GSyCq5KIoMuqGzdCBfuAJoTJdNIOncyEm YlSQtz4K25cKOLWv3Dn3zhps9DWA5d7OOdeZu4JE0aVdpxva2FxaXlltbJWXd/Y3Nq2d3bbSqQSkxYWTMhuiBRhlJOWppqRbiIJikNGOuHoqvA790QqKvidHifEj9GA04hipI0U2PseEwPoRRLh7CHILvK8aDd5Htg1p+5MAOeJW5IaKNEM7C+vL3AaE64xQ0r1XCfRfoakppiRvOqliiQIj9CA9AzlKC bKzyYX5PDIKH0YCWmKazhRf29kKFZqHIdmMkZ6qGa9QvzP66U6OvczypNUE46nD0Upg1rAIg7Yp5JgzcaGICyp+SvEQ2TS0Ca0qgnBnT15nrRP6q5Td29Pa43LMo4KOACH4Bi44Aw0wDVoghbA4BE8g1fwZj1ZL9a79TEdXbDKnT3wB9bnD0gNl2s=</latexit>
logLA,t
<latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3yUA=">AAAB8 3icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKzTxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN 0tb2zu7e+X9g6aJU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+c vvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wjqWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZ kGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlhbyVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1JckTQ =</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3yUA=">AAAB8 3icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKzTxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN 0tb2zu7e+X9g6aJU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+c vvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wjqWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZ kGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlhbyVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1JckTQ =</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3yUA=">AAAB8 3icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKzTxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN 0tb2zu7e+X9g6aJU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+c vvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wjqWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZ kGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlhbyVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1JckTQ =</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D4O4k7d+DHLrHNiGxtdlgm+3yUA=">AAAB8 3icbVA9SwNBEJ2LXzF+RS1tFoNgIeFOBC2jNhYWEcwH5I6wt9kkS/b2jt05IRz5GzYWitj6Z+z8N26SKzTxwcDjvRlm5oWJFAZd99sprKyurW8UN 0tb2zu7e+X9g6aJU814g8Uy1u2QGi6F4g0UKHk70ZxGoeStcHQ79VtPXBsRq0ccJzyI6ECJvmAUreT7Mh6Q+252fYaTbrniVt0ZyDLxclKBHPVu+c vvxSyNuEImqTEdz00wyKhGwSSflPzU8ISyER3wjqWKRtwE2ezmCTmxSo/0Y21LIZmpvycyGhkzjkLbGVEcmkVvKv7ndVLsXwWZUEmKXLH5on4qCcZ kGgDpCc0ZyrEllGlhbyVsSDVlaGMq2RC8xZeXSfO86rlV7+GiUrvJ4yjCERzDKXhwCTW4gzo0gEECz/AKb07qvDjvzse8teDkM4fwB87nD1JckTQ =</latexit>
log
wA,t
wM,t
<latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGXVTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZC TMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIebHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK 5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nff2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGXVTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZC TMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIebHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK 5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nff2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGXVTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZC TMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIebHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK 5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nff2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="50W1gzaYFZXAjXxG7HTDDRmWWbI=">AAACBXicbZDLSsNAFIYn9VbrLepSF4NFcCElEUGXVTduhAr2Ak0ok+mkHTqZC TMTpYRs3Pgqblwo4tZ3cOfbOGmz0NYfBj7+cw5nzh/EjCrtON9WaWFxaXmlvFpZW9/Y3LK3d1pKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawegqr7fviVRU8Ds9jokfoQGnIcVIG6tn73tMDKAXSoTTh156cayzLIebHHp21ak5E8F5cAuogkKNnv3l9QVOIsI1ZkipruvE2k+R1BQzklW8RJEY4REakK 5BjiKi/HRyRQYPjdOHoZDmcQ0n7u+JFEVKjaPAdEZID9VsLTf/q3UTHZ77KeVxognH00VhwqAWMI8E9qkkWLOxAYQlNX+FeIhMItoEVzEhuLMnz0PrpOY6Nff2tFq/LOIogz1wAI6AC85AHVyDBmgCDB7BM3gFb9aT9WK9Wx/T1pJVzOyCP7I+fwDnpZjT</latexit>
logLA,t+1
<latexit sha1_base64="R3oR/hQCsnPmhpXd9kqM4oUiNdI=">AAAB9 XicbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBAEJeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJGuYncwmQ2Z3lpleJSz5Dy8eFPHqv3jzb5w8DppY0FBUddPdFSRSGHTdb2dhcWl5ZTW3l l/f2NzaLuzs1oxKNeNVpqTSjYAaLkXMqyhQ8kaiOY0CyetB/3rk1x+5NkLF9zhIuB/RbixCwSha6aElVZfctrPLEzz2hu1C0S25Y5B54k1JEaaotA tfrY5iacRjZJIa0/TcBP2MahRM8mG+lRqeUNanXd60NKYRN342vnpIDq3SIaHStmIkY/X3REYjYwZRYDsjij0z643E/7xmiuGFn4k4SZHHbLIoTCV BRUYRkI7QnKEcWEKZFvZWwnpUU4Y2qLwNwZt9eZ7UTkueW/Luzorlq2kcOdiHAzgCD86hDDdQgSow0PAMr/DmPDkvzrvzMWldcKYze/AHzucPL+K RpA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="R3oR/hQCsnPmhpXd9kqM4oUiNdI=">AAAB9 XicbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBAEJeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJGuYncwmQ2Z3lpleJSz5Dy8eFPHqv3jzb5w8DppY0FBUddPdFSRSGHTdb2dhcWl5ZTW3l l/f2NzaLuzs1oxKNeNVpqTSjYAaLkXMqyhQ8kaiOY0CyetB/3rk1x+5NkLF9zhIuB/RbixCwSha6aElVZfctrPLEzz2hu1C0S25Y5B54k1JEaaotA tfrY5iacRjZJIa0/TcBP2MahRM8mG+lRqeUNanXd60NKYRN342vnpIDq3SIaHStmIkY/X3REYjYwZRYDsjij0z643E/7xmiuGFn4k4SZHHbLIoTCV BRUYRkI7QnKEcWEKZFvZWwnpUU4Y2qLwNwZt9eZ7UTkueW/Luzorlq2kcOdiHAzgCD86hDDdQgSow0PAMr/DmPDkvzrvzMWldcKYze/AHzucPL+K RpA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="R3oR/hQCsnPmhpXd9kqM4oUiNdI=">AAAB9 XicbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBAEJeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJGuYncwmQ2Z3lpleJSz5Dy8eFPHqv3jzb5w8DppY0FBUddPdFSRSGHTdb2dhcWl5ZTW3l l/f2NzaLuzs1oxKNeNVpqTSjYAaLkXMqyhQ8kaiOY0CyetB/3rk1x+5NkLF9zhIuB/RbixCwSha6aElVZfctrPLEzz2hu1C0S25Y5B54k1JEaaotA tfrY5iacRjZJIa0/TcBP2MahRM8mG+lRqeUNanXd60NKYRN342vnpIDq3SIaHStmIkY/X3REYjYwZRYDsjij0z643E/7xmiuGFn4k4SZHHbLIoTCV BRUYRkI7QnKEcWEKZFvZWwnpUU4Y2qLwNwZt9eZ7UTkueW/Luzorlq2kcOdiHAzgCD86hDDdQgSow0PAMr/DmPDkvzrvzMWldcKYze/AHzucPL+K RpA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="R3oR/hQCsnPmhpXd9kqM4oUiNdI=">AAAB9 XicbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBAEJeyKoMeoFw8eIpgHJGuYncwmQ2Z3lpleJSz5Dy8eFPHqv3jzb5w8DppY0FBUddPdFSRSGHTdb2dhcWl5ZTW3l l/f2NzaLuzs1oxKNeNVpqTSjYAaLkXMqyhQ8kaiOY0CyetB/3rk1x+5NkLF9zhIuB/RbixCwSha6aElVZfctrPLEzz2hu1C0S25Y5B54k1JEaaotA tfrY5iacRjZJIa0/TcBP2MahRM8mG+lRqeUNanXd60NKYRN342vnpIDq3SIaHStmIkY/X3REYjYwZRYDsjij0z643E/7xmiuGFn4k4SZHHbLIoTCV BRUYRkI7QnKEcWEKZFvZWwnpUU4Y2qLwNwZt9eZ7UTkueW/Luzorlq2kcOdiHAzgCD86hDDdQgSow0PAMr/DmPDkvzrvzMWldcKYze/AHzucPL+K RpA==</latexit>
St+1
<latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0WvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwO xFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8SpZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvmrN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalk IyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7qABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0WvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwO xFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8SpZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvmrN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalk IyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7qABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0WvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwO xFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8SpZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvmrN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalk IyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7qABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VWP4cMfnH3pbQZL2doiSyO5deng=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0WvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwO xFK6I/w4kERr/4eb/4bt20O2vpg4PHeDDPzgkQKg6777RTW1jc2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRy8SpZrzJYhnrTkANl0LxJgqUvJNoTqNA8nYwvp357SeujYjVI04S7kd0qEQoGEUrtR/6GV5403654lbdOcgq8XJSgRyNfvmrN4hZGnGFTFJjup6boJ9RjYJJPi31UsMTysZ0yLuWKhpx42fzc6fkzCoDEsbalk IyV39PZDQyZhIFtjOiODLL3kz8z+umGF77mVBJilyxxaIwlQRjMvudDITmDOXEEsq0sLcSNqKaMrQJlWwI3vLLq6R1WfXcqndfq9Rv8jiKcAKncA4eXEEd7qABTWAwhmd4hTcncV6cd+dj0Vpw8plj+APn8wfWj486</latexit>
Dt+1
<latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7 kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLROnmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uWv3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWw rJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uIcGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7 kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLROnmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uWv3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWw rJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uIcGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7 kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLROnmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uWv3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWw rJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uIcGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="n8H2PuzlanG5ulbmyMimIAUUqFA=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBZBEEoiBT0W9eCxgv2ANpTNdtMu3WzC7 kQooT/CiwdFvPp7vPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCxIpDLrut1NYW9/Y3Cpul3Z29/YPyodHLROnmvEmi2WsOwE1XArFmyhQ8k6iOY0CydvB+Hbmt5+4NiJWjzhJuB/RoRKhYBSt1L7rZ3jhTfvlilt15yCrxMtJBXI0+uWv3iBmacQVMkmN6Xpugn5GNQom+bTUSw1PKBvTIe9aqmjEjZ/Nz52SM6sMSBhrWw rJXP09kdHImEkU2M6I4sgsezPxP6+bYnjtZ0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyex3MhCaM5QTSyjTwt5K2IhqytAmVLIheMsvr5LWZdVzq95DrVK/yeMowgmcwjl4cAV1uIcGNIHBGJ7hFd6cxHlx3p2PRWvByWeO4Q+czx+/eY8r</latexit>
logLPEA,t+1
<latexit sha1_base64="vtuWRdDFTYLPBMQH7NhNbgJLKMA=">AAAB/ HicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUV7dLNYBEEpSQi6LIqggsXFewD2hgm00k7dDITZiZCCPFX3LhQxK0f4s6/cdpmoa0HLhzOuZd77wliRpV2nG9rYXFpeWW1t FZe39jc2rZ3dltKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawehq7LcfiVRU8HudxsSL0IDTkGKkjeTblR4TA3j7kDWucz+7ONZHbu7bVafmTADniV uQKijQ8O2vXl/gJCJcY4aU6rpOrL0MSU0xI3m5lygSIzxCA9I1lKOIKC+bHJ/DA6P0YSikKa7hRP09kaFIqTQKTGeE9FDNemPxP6+b6PDcyyiPE00 4ni4KEwa1gOMkYJ9KgjVLDUFYUnMrxEMkEdYmr7IJwZ19eZ60TmquU3PvTqv1yyKOEtgD++AQuOAM1MENaIAmwCAFz+AVvFlP1ov1bn1MWxesYqY C/sD6/AFm3ZPy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vtuWRdDFTYLPBMQH7NhNbgJLKMA=">AAAB/ HicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUV7dLNYBEEpSQi6LIqggsXFewD2hgm00k7dDITZiZCCPFX3LhQxK0f4s6/cdpmoa0HLhzOuZd77wliRpV2nG9rYXFpeWW1t FZe39jc2rZ3dltKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawehq7LcfiVRU8HudxsSL0IDTkGKkjeTblR4TA3j7kDWucz+7ONZHbu7bVafmTADniV uQKijQ8O2vXl/gJCJcY4aU6rpOrL0MSU0xI3m5lygSIzxCA9I1lKOIKC+bHJ/DA6P0YSikKa7hRP09kaFIqTQKTGeE9FDNemPxP6+b6PDcyyiPE00 4ni4KEwa1gOMkYJ9KgjVLDUFYUnMrxEMkEdYmr7IJwZ19eZ60TmquU3PvTqv1yyKOEtgD++AQuOAM1MENaIAmwCAFz+AVvFlP1ov1bn1MWxesYqY C/sD6/AFm3ZPy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vtuWRdDFTYLPBMQH7NhNbgJLKMA=">AAAB/ HicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUV7dLNYBEEpSQi6LIqggsXFewD2hgm00k7dDITZiZCCPFX3LhQxK0f4s6/cdpmoa0HLhzOuZd77wliRpV2nG9rYXFpeWW1t FZe39jc2rZ3dltKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawehq7LcfiVRU8HudxsSL0IDTkGKkjeTblR4TA3j7kDWucz+7ONZHbu7bVafmTADniV uQKijQ8O2vXl/gJCJcY4aU6rpOrL0MSU0xI3m5lygSIzxCA9I1lKOIKC+bHJ/DA6P0YSikKa7hRP09kaFIqTQKTGeE9FDNemPxP6+b6PDcyyiPE00 4ni4KEwa1gOMkYJ9KgjVLDUFYUnMrxEMkEdYmr7IJwZ19eZ60TmquU3PvTqv1yyKOEtgD++AQuOAM1MENaIAmwCAFz+AVvFlP1ov1bn1MWxesYqY C/sD6/AFm3ZPy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="hP+6LrUf2d3tZaldqaQQvEKMXyw=">AAAB2 XicbZDNSgMxFIXv1L86Vq1rN8EiuCozbnQpuHFZwbZCO5RM5k4bmskMyR2hDH0BF25EfC93vo3pz0JbDwQ+zknIvSculLQUBN9ebWd3b/+gfugfN fzjk9Nmo2fz0gjsilzl5jnmFpXU2CVJCp8LgzyLFfbj6f0i77+gsTLXTzQrMMr4WMtUCk7O6oyaraAdLMW2IVxDC9YaNb+GSS7KDDUJxa0dhEFBUc UNSaFw7g9LiwUXUz7GgUPNM7RRtRxzzi6dk7A0N+5oYkv394uKZ9bOstjdzDhN7Ga2MP/LBiWlt1EldVESarH6KC0Vo5wtdmaJNChIzRxwYaSblYk JN1yQa8Z3HYSbG29D77odBu3wMYA6nMMFXEEIN3AHD9CBLghI4BXevYn35n2suqp569LO4I+8zx84xIo4</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HjXEv3wWN/yqDzEnjjo2n2PR9/8=">AAAB8 XicbZBLSwMxFIXv+Ky16qhLN8EiCEqZcaNLRQQXLirYB7TjkEkzbWgmGZKMUIbxr7hxoYh/xp3/xvSx0NYDgY9zEu7NiVLOtPG8b2dpeWV1bb20U d6sbG3vuLuVppaZIrRBJJeqHWFNORO0YZjhtJ0qipOI01Y0vB7nrSeqNJPiwYxSGiS4L1jMCDbWCt39Lpd9dPeY12+KML86NSd+EbpVr+ZNhBbBn0 EVZqqH7le3J0mWUGEIx1p3fC81QY6VYYTTotzNNE0xGeI+7VgUOKE6yCfLF+jIOj0US2WPMGji/n6R40TrURLZmwk2Az2fjc3/sk5m4osgZyLNDBV kOijOODISjZtAPaYoMXxkARPF7K6IDLDCxNi+yrYEf/7Li9A8q/lezb/3oAQHcAjH4MM5XMIt1KEBBEbwAm/w7jw7r87HtK4lZ9bbHvyR8/kDCT2 Siw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HjXEv3wWN/yqDzEnjjo2n2PR9/8=">AAAB8 XicbZBLSwMxFIXv+Ky16qhLN8EiCEqZcaNLRQQXLirYB7TjkEkzbWgmGZKMUIbxr7hxoYh/xp3/xvSx0NYDgY9zEu7NiVLOtPG8b2dpeWV1bb20U d6sbG3vuLuVppaZIrRBJJeqHWFNORO0YZjhtJ0qipOI01Y0vB7nrSeqNJPiwYxSGiS4L1jMCDbWCt39Lpd9dPeY12+KML86NSd+EbpVr+ZNhBbBn0 EVZqqH7le3J0mWUGEIx1p3fC81QY6VYYTTotzNNE0xGeI+7VgUOKE6yCfLF+jIOj0US2WPMGji/n6R40TrURLZmwk2Az2fjc3/sk5m4osgZyLNDBV kOijOODISjZtAPaYoMXxkARPF7K6IDLDCxNi+yrYEf/7Li9A8q/lezb/3oAQHcAjH4MM5XMIt1KEBBEbwAm/w7jw7r87HtK4lZ9bbHvyR8/kDCT2 Siw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="x0QRgd0MiFQE4weWSxoPCjHAK84=">AAAB/ HicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vaJduBosgKCVxo8uqCC5cVLAPaGOYTCft0MlMmJkIIcRfceNCEbd+iDv/xmmbhbYeuHA4517uvSeIGVXacb6t0tLyyupae b2ysbm1vWPv7rWVSCQmLSyYkN0AKcIoJy1NNSPdWBIUBYx0gvHVxO88Eqmo4Pc6jYkXoSGnIcVIG8m3q30mhvD2IWte5352caKP3dy3a07dmQIuEr cgNVCg6dtf/YHASUS4xgwp1XOdWHsZkppiRvJKP1EkRniMhqRnKEcRUV42PT6Hh0YZwFBIU1zDqfp7IkORUmkUmM4I6ZGa9ybif14v0eG5l1EeJ5p wPFsUJgxqASdJwAGVBGuWGoKwpOZWiEdIIqxNXhUTgjv/8iJpn9Zdp+7eObXGZRFHGeyDA3AEXHAGGuAGNEELYJCCZ/AK3qwn68V6tz5mrSWrmKm CP7A+fwBlnZPu</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vtuWRdDFTYLPBMQH7NhNbgJLKMA=">AAAB/ HicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUV7dLNYBEEpSQi6LIqggsXFewD2hgm00k7dDITZiZCCPFX3LhQxK0f4s6/cdpmoa0HLhzOuZd77wliRpV2nG9rYXFpeWW1t FZe39jc2rZ3dltKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawehq7LcfiVRU8HudxsSL0IDTkGKkjeTblR4TA3j7kDWucz+7ONZHbu7bVafmTADniV uQKijQ8O2vXl/gJCJcY4aU6rpOrL0MSU0xI3m5lygSIzxCA9I1lKOIKC+bHJ/DA6P0YSikKa7hRP09kaFIqTQKTGeE9FDNemPxP6+b6PDcyyiPE00 4ni4KEwa1gOMkYJ9KgjVLDUFYUnMrxEMkEdYmr7IJwZ19eZ60TmquU3PvTqv1yyKOEtgD++AQuOAM1MENaIAmwCAFz+AVvFlP1ov1bn1MWxesYqY C/sD6/AFm3ZPy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vtuWRdDFTYLPBMQH7NhNbgJLKMA=">AAAB/ HicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUV7dLNYBEEpSQi6LIqggsXFewD2hgm00k7dDITZiZCCPFX3LhQxK0f4s6/cdpmoa0HLhzOuZd77wliRpV2nG9rYXFpeWW1t FZe39jc2rZ3dltKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawehq7LcfiVRU8HudxsSL0IDTkGKkjeTblR4TA3j7kDWucz+7ONZHbu7bVafmTADniV uQKijQ8O2vXl/gJCJcY4aU6rpOrL0MSU0xI3m5lygSIzxCA9I1lKOIKC+bHJ/DA6P0YSikKa7hRP09kaFIqTQKTGeE9FDNemPxP6+b6PDcyyiPE00 4ni4KEwa1gOMkYJ9KgjVLDUFYUnMrxEMkEdYmr7IJwZ19eZ60TmquU3PvTqv1yyKOEtgD++AQuOAM1MENaIAmwCAFz+AVvFlP1ov1bn1MWxesYqY C/sD6/AFm3ZPy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vtuWRdDFTYLPBMQH7NhNbgJLKMA=">AAAB/ HicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUV7dLNYBEEpSQi6LIqggsXFewD2hgm00k7dDITZiZCCPFX3LhQxK0f4s6/cdpmoa0HLhzOuZd77wliRpV2nG9rYXFpeWW1t FZe39jc2rZ3dltKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawehq7LcfiVRU8HudxsSL0IDTkGKkjeTblR4TA3j7kDWucz+7ONZHbu7bVafmTADniV uQKijQ8O2vXl/gJCJcY4aU6rpOrL0MSU0xI3m5lygSIzxCA9I1lKOIKC+bHJ/DA6P0YSikKa7hRP09kaFIqTQKTGeE9FDNemPxP6+b6PDcyyiPE00 4ni4KEwa1gOMkYJ9KgjVLDUFYUnMrxEMkEdYmr7IJwZ19eZ60TmquU3PvTqv1yyKOEtgD++AQuOAM1MENaIAmwCAFz+AVvFlP1ov1bn1MWxesYqY C/sD6/AFm3ZPy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vtuWRdDFTYLPBMQH7NhNbgJLKMA=">AAAB/ HicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUV7dLNYBEEpSQi6LIqggsXFewD2hgm00k7dDITZiZCCPFX3LhQxK0f4s6/cdpmoa0HLhzOuZd77wliRpV2nG9rYXFpeWW1t FZe39jc2rZ3dltKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawehq7LcfiVRU8HudxsSL0IDTkGKkjeTblR4TA3j7kDWucz+7ONZHbu7bVafmTADniV uQKijQ8O2vXl/gJCJcY4aU6rpOrL0MSU0xI3m5lygSIzxCA9I1lKOIKC+bHJ/DA6P0YSikKa7hRP09kaFIqTQKTGeE9FDNemPxP6+b6PDcyyiPE00 4ni4KEwa1gOMkYJ9KgjVLDUFYUnMrxEMkEdYmr7IJwZ19eZ60TmquU3PvTqv1yyKOEtgD++AQuOAM1MENaIAmwCAFz+AVvFlP1ov1bn1MWxesYqY C/sD6/AFm3ZPy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vtuWRdDFTYLPBMQH7NhNbgJLKMA=">AAAB/ HicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUV7dLNYBEEpSQi6LIqggsXFewD2hgm00k7dDITZiZCCPFX3LhQxK0f4s6/cdpmoa0HLhzOuZd77wliRpV2nG9rYXFpeWW1t FZe39jc2rZ3dltKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawehq7LcfiVRU8HudxsSL0IDTkGKkjeTblR4TA3j7kDWucz+7ONZHbu7bVafmTADniV uQKijQ8O2vXl/gJCJcY4aU6rpOrL0MSU0xI3m5lygSIzxCA9I1lKOIKC+bHJ/DA6P0YSikKa7hRP09kaFIqTQKTGeE9FDNemPxP6+b6PDcyyiPE00 4ni4KEwa1gOMkYJ9KgjVLDUFYUnMrxEMkEdYmr7IJwZ19eZ60TmquU3PvTqv1yyKOEtgD++AQuOAM1MENaIAmwCAFz+AVvFlP1ov1bn1MWxesYqY C/sD6/AFm3ZPy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vtuWRdDFTYLPBMQH7NhNbgJLKMA=">AAAB/ HicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUV7dLNYBEEpSQi6LIqggsXFewD2hgm00k7dDITZiZCCPFX3LhQxK0f4s6/cdpmoa0HLhzOuZd77wliRpV2nG9rYXFpeWW1t FZe39jc2rZ3dltKJBKTJhZMyE6AFGGUk6ammpFOLAmKAkbawehq7LcfiVRU8HudxsSL0IDTkGKkjeTblR4TA3j7kDWucz+7ONZHbu7bVafmTADniV uQKijQ8O2vXl/gJCJcY4aU6rpOrL0MSU0xI3m5lygSIzxCA9I1lKOIKC+bHJ/DA6P0YSikKa7hRP09kaFIqTQKTGeE9FDNemPxP6+b6PDcyyiPE00 4ni4KEwa1gOMkYJ9KgjVLDUFYUnMrxEMkEdYmr7IJwZ19eZ60TmquU3PvTqv1yyKOEtgD++AQuOAM1MENaIAmwCAFz+AVvFlP1ov1bn1MWxesYqY C/sD6/AFm3ZPy</latexit>
Cohort
<latexit sha1_base64="Iv4qV9wJzX7m4UT4EJmeYTko2rs=">AAAB9 XicbVBNS8NAEN34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokIeiz24rGC/YC2ls120i7dZMPuRC2h/8OLB0W8+l+8+W/ctDlo64OBx3szzMzzYykMuu63s7K6tr6xWdgqb u/s7u2XDg6bRiWaQ4MrqXTbZwakiKCBAiW0Yw0s9CW0/HEt81sPoI1Q0R1OYuiFbBiJQHCGVrrvIjxhWlMjpXFa7JfKbsWdgS4TLydlkqPeL311B4 onIUTIJTOm47kx9lKmUXAJ02I3MRAzPmZD6FgasRBML51dPaWnVhnQQGlbEdKZ+nsiZaExk9C3nSHDkVn0MvE/r5NgcNVLRRQnCBGfLwoSSVHRLAI 6EBo4yokljGthb6V8xDTjaIPKQvAWX14mzfOK51a824ty9TqPo0COyQk5Ix65JFVyQ+qkQTjR5Jm8kjfn0Xlx3p2PeeuKk88ckT9wPn8AqGSSmA= =</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Iv4qV9wJzX7m4UT4EJmeYTko2rs=">AAAB9 XicbVBNS8NAEN34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokIeiz24rGC/YC2ls120i7dZMPuRC2h/8OLB0W8+l+8+W/ctDlo64OBx3szzMzzYykMuu63s7K6tr6xWdgqb u/s7u2XDg6bRiWaQ4MrqXTbZwakiKCBAiW0Yw0s9CW0/HEt81sPoI1Q0R1OYuiFbBiJQHCGVrrvIjxhWlMjpXFa7JfKbsWdgS4TLydlkqPeL311B4 onIUTIJTOm47kx9lKmUXAJ02I3MRAzPmZD6FgasRBML51dPaWnVhnQQGlbEdKZ+nsiZaExk9C3nSHDkVn0MvE/r5NgcNVLRRQnCBGfLwoSSVHRLAI 6EBo4yokljGthb6V8xDTjaIPKQvAWX14mzfOK51a824ty9TqPo0COyQk5Ix65JFVyQ+qkQTjR5Jm8kjfn0Xlx3p2PeeuKk88ckT9wPn8AqGSSmA= =</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Iv4qV9wJzX7m4UT4EJmeYTko2rs=">AAAB9 XicbVBNS8NAEN34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokIeiz24rGC/YC2ls120i7dZMPuRC2h/8OLB0W8+l+8+W/ctDlo64OBx3szzMzzYykMuu63s7K6tr6xWdgqb u/s7u2XDg6bRiWaQ4MrqXTbZwakiKCBAiW0Yw0s9CW0/HEt81sPoI1Q0R1OYuiFbBiJQHCGVrrvIjxhWlMjpXFa7JfKbsWdgS4TLydlkqPeL311B4 onIUTIJTOm47kx9lKmUXAJ02I3MRAzPmZD6FgasRBML51dPaWnVhnQQGlbEdKZ+nsiZaExk9C3nSHDkVn0MvE/r5NgcNVLRRQnCBGfLwoSSVHRLAI 6EBo4yokljGthb6V8xDTjaIPKQvAWX14mzfOK51a824ty9TqPo0COyQk5Ix65JFVyQ+qkQTjR5Jm8kjfn0Xlx3p2PeeuKk88ckT9wPn8AqGSSmA= =</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Iv4qV9wJzX7m4UT4EJmeYTko2rs=">AAAB9 XicbVBNS8NAEN34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokIeiz24rGC/YC2ls120i7dZMPuRC2h/8OLB0W8+l+8+W/ctDlo64OBx3szzMzzYykMuu63s7K6tr6xWdgqb u/s7u2XDg6bRiWaQ4MrqXTbZwakiKCBAiW0Yw0s9CW0/HEt81sPoI1Q0R1OYuiFbBiJQHCGVrrvIjxhWlMjpXFa7JfKbsWdgS4TLydlkqPeL311B4 onIUTIJTOm47kx9lKmUXAJ02I3MRAzPmZD6FgasRBML51dPaWnVhnQQGlbEdKZ+nsiZaExk9C3nSHDkVn0MvE/r5NgcNVLRRQnCBGfLwoSSVHRLAI 6EBo4yokljGthb6V8xDTjaIPKQvAWX14mzfOK51a824ty9TqPo0COyQk5Ix65JFVyQ+qkQTjR5Jm8kjfn0Xlx3p2PeeuKk88ckT9wPn8AqGSSmA= =</latexit>
Year
<latexit sha1_base64="cN1eJKJYMKF9Tzcmu+D+I3zI2GI=">AAAB8 3icbVBNS8NAEN3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cKtlWaUDbbSbt0swm7E7GE/g0vHhTx6p/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvTKUw6LrfTmlldW19o7xZ2 dre2d2r7h+0TZJpDi2eyETfh8yAFApaKFDCfaqBxaGETji6nvqdR9BGJOoOxykEMRsoEQnO0Eq+j/CE+QMwPan0qjW37s5Al4lXkBop0OxVv/x+wr MYFHLJjOl6bopBzjQKLmFS8TMDKeMjNoCupYrFYIJ8dvOEnlilT6NE21JIZ+rviZzFxozj0HbGDIdm0ZuK/3ndDKPLIBcqzRAUny+KMkkxodMAaF9 o4CjHljCuhb2V8iHTjKONaRqCt/jyMmmf1T237t2e1xpXRRxlckSOySnxyAVpkBvSJC3CSUqeySt5czLnxXl3PuatJaeYOSR/4Hz+AAOWkaY=</l atexit><latexit sha1_base64="cN1eJKJYMKF9Tzcmu+D+I3zI2GI=">AAAB8 3icbVBNS8NAEN3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cKtlWaUDbbSbt0swm7E7GE/g0vHhTx6p/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvTKUw6LrfTmlldW19o7xZ2 dre2d2r7h+0TZJpDi2eyETfh8yAFApaKFDCfaqBxaGETji6nvqdR9BGJOoOxykEMRsoEQnO0Eq+j/CE+QMwPan0qjW37s5Al4lXkBop0OxVv/x+wr MYFHLJjOl6bopBzjQKLmFS8TMDKeMjNoCupYrFYIJ8dvOEnlilT6NE21JIZ+rviZzFxozj0HbGDIdm0ZuK/3ndDKPLIBcqzRAUny+KMkkxodMAaF9 o4CjHljCuhb2V8iHTjKONaRqCt/jyMmmf1T237t2e1xpXRRxlckSOySnxyAVpkBvSJC3CSUqeySt5czLnxXl3PuatJaeYOSR/4Hz+AAOWkaY=</l atexit><latexit sha1_base64="cN1eJKJYMKF9Tzcmu+D+I3zI2GI=">AAAB8 3icbVBNS8NAEN3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cKtlWaUDbbSbt0swm7E7GE/g0vHhTx6p/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvTKUw6LrfTmlldW19o7xZ2 dre2d2r7h+0TZJpDi2eyETfh8yAFApaKFDCfaqBxaGETji6nvqdR9BGJOoOxykEMRsoEQnO0Eq+j/CE+QMwPan0qjW37s5Al4lXkBop0OxVv/x+wr MYFHLJjOl6bopBzjQKLmFS8TMDKeMjNoCupYrFYIJ8dvOEnlilT6NE21JIZ+rviZzFxozj0HbGDIdm0ZuK/3ndDKPLIBcqzRAUny+KMkkxodMAaF9 o4CjHljCuhb2V8iHTjKONaRqCt/jyMmmf1T237t2e1xpXRRxlckSOySnxyAVpkBvSJC3CSUqeySt5czLnxXl3PuatJaeYOSR/4Hz+AAOWkaY=</l atexit><latexit sha1_base64="cN1eJKJYMKF9Tzcmu+D+I3zI2GI=">AAAB8 3icbVBNS8NAEN3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cKtlWaUDbbSbt0swm7E7GE/g0vHhTx6p/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvTKUw6LrfTmlldW19o7xZ2 dre2d2r7h+0TZJpDi2eyETfh8yAFApaKFDCfaqBxaGETji6nvqdR9BGJOoOxykEMRsoEQnO0Eq+j/CE+QMwPan0qjW37s5Al4lXkBop0OxVv/x+wr MYFHLJjOl6bopBzjQKLmFS8TMDKeMjNoCupYrFYIJ8dvOEnlilT6NE21JIZ+rviZzFxozj0HbGDIdm0ZuK/3ndDKPLIBcqzRAUny+KMkkxodMAaF9 o4CjHljCuhb2V8iHTjKONaRqCt/jyMmmf1T237t2e1xpXRRxlckSOySnxyAVpkBvSJC3CSUqeySt5czLnxXl3PuatJaeYOSR/4Hz+AAOWkaY=</l atexit>
Component
<latexit sha1_base64="HG3FwFYDdy8tqbTPkpf58bZhoSM=">AAAB+ nicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vqS7dBIvgqsyIoMtiNy4r2Ae0pWTSTBuaSYbkjlrGfoobF4q49Uvc+Tdm2llo64HA4Zx7uDcniAU34HnfTmFtfWNzq7hd2 tnd2z9wy4ctoxJNWZMqoXQnIIYJLlkTOAjWiTUjUSBYO5jUM799z7ThSt7BNGb9iIwkDzklYKWBW+4Be4S0rqJYSSZhVhq4Fa/qzYFXiZ+TCsrRGL hfvaGiSWTTVBBjur4XQz8lGjgVbFbqJYbFhE7IiHUtlSRipp/OT5/hU6sMcai0fRLwXP2dSElkzDQK7GREYGyWvUz8z+smEF71Uy7jBJiki0VhIjA onPWAh1wzCmJqCaGa21sxHRNNKNi2shL85S+vktZ51feq/u1FpXad11FEx+gEnSEfXaIaukEN1EQUPaBn9IrenCfnxXl3PhajBSfPHKE/cD5/AI1 6lCs=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HG3FwFYDdy8tqbTPkpf58bZhoSM=">AAAB+ nicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vqS7dBIvgqsyIoMtiNy4r2Ae0pWTSTBuaSYbkjlrGfoobF4q49Uvc+Tdm2llo64HA4Zx7uDcniAU34HnfTmFtfWNzq7hd2 tnd2z9wy4ctoxJNWZMqoXQnIIYJLlkTOAjWiTUjUSBYO5jUM799z7ThSt7BNGb9iIwkDzklYKWBW+4Be4S0rqJYSSZhVhq4Fa/qzYFXiZ+TCsrRGL hfvaGiSWTTVBBjur4XQz8lGjgVbFbqJYbFhE7IiHUtlSRipp/OT5/hU6sMcai0fRLwXP2dSElkzDQK7GREYGyWvUz8z+smEF71Uy7jBJiki0VhIjA onPWAh1wzCmJqCaGa21sxHRNNKNi2shL85S+vktZ51feq/u1FpXad11FEx+gEnSEfXaIaukEN1EQUPaBn9IrenCfnxXl3PhajBSfPHKE/cD5/AI1 6lCs=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HG3FwFYDdy8tqbTPkpf58bZhoSM=">AAAB+ nicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vqS7dBIvgqsyIoMtiNy4r2Ae0pWTSTBuaSYbkjlrGfoobF4q49Uvc+Tdm2llo64HA4Zx7uDcniAU34HnfTmFtfWNzq7hd2 tnd2z9wy4ctoxJNWZMqoXQnIIYJLlkTOAjWiTUjUSBYO5jUM799z7ThSt7BNGb9iIwkDzklYKWBW+4Be4S0rqJYSSZhVhq4Fa/qzYFXiZ+TCsrRGL hfvaGiSWTTVBBjur4XQz8lGjgVbFbqJYbFhE7IiHUtlSRipp/OT5/hU6sMcai0fRLwXP2dSElkzDQK7GREYGyWvUz8z+smEF71Uy7jBJiki0VhIjA onPWAh1wzCmJqCaGa21sxHRNNKNi2shL85S+vktZ51feq/u1FpXad11FEx+gEnSEfXaIaukEN1EQUPaBn9IrenCfnxXl3PhajBSfPHKE/cD5/AI1 6lCs=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HG3FwFYDdy8tqbTPkpf58bZhoSM=">AAAB+ nicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vqS7dBIvgqsyIoMtiNy4r2Ae0pWTSTBuaSYbkjlrGfoobF4q49Uvc+Tdm2llo64HA4Zx7uDcniAU34HnfTmFtfWNzq7hd2 tnd2z9wy4ctoxJNWZMqoXQnIIYJLlkTOAjWiTUjUSBYO5jUM799z7ThSt7BNGb9iIwkDzklYKWBW+4Be4S0rqJYSSZhVhq4Fa/qzYFXiZ+TCsrRGL hfvaGiSWTTVBBjur4XQz8lGjgVbFbqJYbFhE7IiHUtlSRipp/OT5/hU6sMcai0fRLwXP2dSElkzDQK7GREYGyWvUz8z+smEF71Uy7jBJiki0VhIjA onPWAh1wzCmJqCaGa21sxHRNNKNi2shL85S+vktZ51feq/u1FpXad11FEx+gEnSEfXaIaukEN1EQUPaBn9IrenCfnxXl3PhajBSfPHKE/cD5/AI1 6lCs=</latexit>
Component
<latexit sha1_base64="HG3FwFYDdy8tqbTPkpf58bZhoSM=">AAAB+ nicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vqS7dBIvgqsyIoMtiNy4r2Ae0pWTSTBuaSYbkjlrGfoobF4q49Uvc+Tdm2llo64HA4Zx7uDcniAU34HnfTmFtfWNzq7hd2 tnd2z9wy4ctoxJNWZMqoXQnIIYJLlkTOAjWiTUjUSBYO5jUM799z7ThSt7BNGb9iIwkDzklYKWBW+4Be4S0rqJYSSZhVhq4Fa/qzYFXiZ+TCsrRGL hfvaGiSWTTVBBjur4XQz8lGjgVbFbqJYbFhE7IiHUtlSRipp/OT5/hU6sMcai0fRLwXP2dSElkzDQK7GREYGyWvUz8z+smEF71Uy7jBJiki0VhIjA onPWAh1wzCmJqCaGa21sxHRNNKNi2shL85S+vktZ51feq/u1FpXad11FEx+gEnSEfXaIaukEN1EQUPaBn9IrenCfnxXl3PhajBSfPHKE/cD5/AI1 6lCs=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HG3FwFYDdy8tqbTPkpf58bZhoSM=">AAAB+ nicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vqS7dBIvgqsyIoMtiNy4r2Ae0pWTSTBuaSYbkjlrGfoobF4q49Uvc+Tdm2llo64HA4Zx7uDcniAU34HnfTmFtfWNzq7hd2 tnd2z9wy4ctoxJNWZMqoXQnIIYJLlkTOAjWiTUjUSBYO5jUM799z7ThSt7BNGb9iIwkDzklYKWBW+4Be4S0rqJYSSZhVhq4Fa/qzYFXiZ+TCsrRGL hfvaGiSWTTVBBjur4XQz8lGjgVbFbqJYbFhE7IiHUtlSRipp/OT5/hU6sMcai0fRLwXP2dSElkzDQK7GREYGyWvUz8z+smEF71Uy7jBJiki0VhIjA onPWAh1wzCmJqCaGa21sxHRNNKNi2shL85S+vktZ51feq/u1FpXad11FEx+gEnSEfXaIaukEN1EQUPaBn9IrenCfnxXl3PhajBSfPHKE/cD5/AI1 6lCs=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HG3FwFYDdy8tqbTPkpf58bZhoSM=">AAAB+ nicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vqS7dBIvgqsyIoMtiNy4r2Ae0pWTSTBuaSYbkjlrGfoobF4q49Uvc+Tdm2llo64HA4Zx7uDcniAU34HnfTmFtfWNzq7hd2 tnd2z9wy4ctoxJNWZMqoXQnIIYJLlkTOAjWiTUjUSBYO5jUM799z7ThSt7BNGb9iIwkDzklYKWBW+4Be4S0rqJYSSZhVhq4Fa/qzYFXiZ+TCsrRGL hfvaGiSWTTVBBjur4XQz8lGjgVbFbqJYbFhE7IiHUtlSRipp/OT5/hU6sMcai0fRLwXP2dSElkzDQK7GREYGyWvUz8z+smEF71Uy7jBJiki0VhIjA onPWAh1wzCmJqCaGa21sxHRNNKNi2shL85S+vktZ51feq/u1FpXad11FEx+gEnSEfXaIaukEN1EQUPaBn9IrenCfnxXl3PhajBSfPHKE/cD5/AI1 6lCs=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="HG3FwFYDdy8tqbTPkpf58bZhoSM=">AAAB+ nicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vqS7dBIvgqsyIoMtiNy4r2Ae0pWTSTBuaSYbkjlrGfoobF4q49Uvc+Tdm2llo64HA4Zx7uDcniAU34HnfTmFtfWNzq7hd2 tnd2z9wy4ctoxJNWZMqoXQnIIYJLlkTOAjWiTUjUSBYO5jUM799z7ThSt7BNGb9iIwkDzklYKWBW+4Be4S0rqJYSSZhVhq4Fa/qzYFXiZ+TCsrRGL hfvaGiSWTTVBBjur4XQz8lGjgVbFbqJYbFhE7IiHUtlSRipp/OT5/hU6sMcai0fRLwXP2dSElkzDQK7GREYGyWvUz8z+smEF71Uy7jBJiki0VhIjA onPWAh1wzCmJqCaGa21sxHRNNKNi2shL85S+vktZ51feq/u1FpXad11FEx+gEnSEfXaIaukEN1EQUPaBn9IrenCfnxXl3PhajBSfPHKE/cD5/AI1 6lCs=</latexit>
5.4 Mapping to the Empirical Decomposition
We now discuss how the model maps into the empirical decomposition of labor reallo-
cation presented in Section 3. We start by considering the frictionless case in order to build
intuition, and then turn to the general case.
In absence of mobility frictions (i.e for i = f = 0), the log agricultural employment at
time t of any cohort c can be written as
31Assumption 2 guarantees that frictions are sufficiently small to generate positive reallocation. Trivially,
if f ! 1 or i ! 1, there would be no reallocation. Reallocation is either zero, or does not depend on f
and i. Our parametric restrictions exclude the case in which reallocation is zero.
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log lA,t,c = ˆ +
⌫
1    log
 
ptztX
↵L ↵A,t
 
| {z }
year effects
  ⌫ 
1    log hc| {z }
cohort effects
where ˆ is a cohort- and time-invariant function of parameters. This equation maps into the
empirical specification (1). Through the lens of the model, cohort effects are proportional
to cohort-level human capital, while year effects are proportional to the relative wage across
sectors, which depends on aggregate prices and quantities. The age effects introduced in
specification (5) are redundant in this case; once time and cohort effects are accounted for,
age does not play any independent role.
Consider the year and cohort components, as defined in (2)-(4), of the rate of labor
reallocation between t and t + 1. The year component captures the difference between the
year effects associated to t and t+1, which is identified by the average change in agricultural
employment for a given cohort. In the frictionless model the rate of reallocation is common
across all cohorts, so that - for any c - the year component is given by
log t = log lA,t+1,c   log lA,t,c = v
1    ((1 ⇥D) log g✓z +⇥S  log gh)
where the second equality follows from plugging the expression for log gLA from Proposition
1 into equation (14). The cohort component captures the change over time in the average
cohort effects for the active cohorts. Given that in our model cohort effects change across
cohorts by a constant amount, this corresponds to the difference between the cohort effects
of any two consecutive cohorts, which in turn is given by the cross-cohort agricultural
employment gaps averaged across all time periods. In absence of frictions these cross-cohort
gaps are constant over time, so that - for any t - the cohort component is
log t = Cc+1   Cc = log lA,t,c+1   log lA,t,c =   ⌫ 
1    log gh. (15)
These two quantities correspond to different aspects of the process of labor reallocation.
Notice from equation (St) that (15) represents the magnitude of the shift in the agricultural
labor supply driven by human capital growth. As displayed in Figure XII, the cohort
component captures the partial equilibrium effect of the change in supply, i.e. the decrease
from logLA,t to logLPEA,t+1. The year component captures the residual part of reallocation, i.e.
the difference between logLPEA,t+1and logLA,t+1. Intuitively, gaps in agricultural employment
between different cohorts at a given point in time (i.e. the cohort component) identify the
extent to which changes in human capital shift the supply curve, keeping wages fixed; on
the other hand, changes over time for a given cohort (i.e. the year component) identify the
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movement along a given supply curve driven by changes in relative wages.
Consider now the general case with mobility frictions. Under specification (1), the struc-
tural interpretations of the cohort and year components discussed above would not apply.
Lemma 1 shows that the rate of reallocation across t and t+ 1 is cohort-specific, with con-
strained cohorts not reallocating at all; the year component would therefore pick up the
reallocation rate of unconstrained cohorts, scaled down by the share of constrained cohorts.
By the same logic, the cohort component would be larger than   ⌫ 1   log gh, as it would
combine the cross-cohort employment gaps for both unconstrained cohorts and constrained
cohorts, with the latter being larger than the former. This is where the age controls intro-
duced in specification (5) become important. Under the identification restriction of a zero
age effect for any young (unconstrained) cohort, age controls capture the reallocation be-
havior of old (constrained) cohorts, so that the resulting year and cohort components retain
the structural interpretations illustrated in Figure XII. The following proposition formalizes
this result.
Proposition 2: Decomposition of Labor Reallocation
Consider the specification
log lA,t,c| {z }
agr share of cohort c at time t
= Y˜t|{z}
year effects
+ C˜c|{z}
cohort effects
+ A˜t c|{z}
age dummies
+ "t,c
estimated with model-generated data under the restriction that A˜a = A˜a 1, where a 2 [1, aˆ].
Define the year and cohort components of labor reallocation between t and t+ 1 as
log  ˜t ⌘ Y˜t+1   Y˜t
log  ˜t = logLA,t+1   logLA,t   log  ˜t+1.
Then, for all t,
log  ˜t = log  ˜ =
✓
v
1   
◆ 
(1 ⇥D) log g✓z +⇥S  log gh
!
log  ˜t = log  ˜ = 
✓
v
1   
◆
  log gh.
Proof. See Appendix.  
The following corollary shows how the omission of age controls biases the estimates of
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the two components. Since mobility frictions limit the reallocation of older workers, not
controlling for age results in an overstatement of the cohort component and an understate-
ment of the year component. The difference between the year components estimated with
and without age controls is proportional to the share of constrained cohorts,  (f), a natural
measure of the severity of reallocation frictions.
Corollary 1: Bias in the Basic Decomposition
Consider specification (1) estimated with model-generated data. The estimated year and
cohort components would be
log =
 
1    (f)
!
log  ˜
log  = log  ˜+
  (f)
1    (f) log  ˜
where  (f) 2 ⇥0, 1  is the share of constrained cohorts,
 (f) =
N + 1  aˆ
N + 1
which is increasing in the fixed cost f and does not depend on the iceberg cost i.
Proof. See Appendix.  
Implications for Wage Data. The mapping between the model and the decomposition
developed in this section implies that both human capital growth and reallocation frictions
can be quantified without relying on the measurement of wages, which is notoriously diffi-
cult for developing countries and the agricultural sector. The model does have predictions
on wages that are in line with the limited available evidence; in particular, we show in
Appendix E.4 that it is consistent with the observational wage gains for workers moving
from agriculture to non-agriculture being smaller than the corresponding cross-sectional
gaps (Hicks et al., 2017; Herrendorf and Schoellman, 2018; Alvarez, 2020). However, our
analysis in Appendix E.4 also shows that wage data, even if with a panel dimension, would
not be enough to infer the magnitude of the frictions; the fixed cost makes the sectoral de-
cision dynamic, and to estimate mobility costs one would need the hypothetical wage paths
in agriculture in non-agriculture for both movers and non-movers. Corollary 1 provides an
alternative way of quantifying these costs.
6 Quantitative Results
We revisit the empirical results of Section 3 through the lens of our model to quantify
the contribution of the global human capital increase to structural transformation.
36
6.1 Revisiting the Decomposition Results
The model developed in Section 5 provides us with a structural interpretation of the
empirical results in Section 3. As shown in Table I, the cohort component is on average
 0.78%, corresponding to 38% of the observed rate of labor reallocation. Proposition 2
tells us how to read these figures in the context of the model: human capital growth has
induced, on average across countries, a downward shift of the agricultural labor supply at
annual rate of  0.78%. This result highlights the key take-away of the paper: changes
over time in agricultural labor supply represent a key feature of the process of structural
transformation, which is missed by models that abstract from workers’ skills and their
differential use across sectors.
The model also guides us in the understanding of the aggregate effects of this shift in
agricultural labor supply. In a world where wages are kept fixed, the cohort component
coincides with the rate of labor reallocation induced by human capital growth, representing
38% of the overall reallocation. In general equilibrium, the impact of the supply shift is
mediated by the multiplier 1   ⇥s (as defined in Proposition 1), which summarizes the
adjustment of relative prices. We discuss two approaches to quantify 1 ⇥s in Section 6.2.
Finally, Corollary 1 shows that the comparison between the decomposition results with
and without age controls is directly informative on the severity of reallocation frictions. To
illustrate this, we compute for each country j in the sample the value of  (fj) implied by
the model as   (fj) = 1  log  ¯jlog  ˜j , and display summary statistics in column 6 of Table I. On
average across countries,  (fj) is approximately 30%, which means individuals’ reallocation
decision is constrained by the fixed cost in the last 30% of their work-life, or approximately
in our sample, after they turn 45 years old. Rows 2-4 report the average  (fj) separately for
low-, middle-, and high-income countries. Frictions are virtually non-existing in high-income
countries, and considerably more severe in poorer countries.
6.2 General Equilibrium Effects
The cohort component captures the magnitude of the supply shift associated with human
capital growth. How large is the equilibrium impact of such shift? Answering this question
requires going beyond the empirical decomposition and taking a stand on the parameters
mediating the adjustment of relative prices. Combining Propositions 1 and 2, the overall
impact of human capital growth on labor reallocation is the product of the cohort component
and the general equilibrium multiplier,
log gLA =(1 ⇥D) log g✓z + (1 ⇥S)| {z }
ge multiplier
⇥ log  ˜|{z}
cohort component
, (16)
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where (1 ⇥S) = 1 ⌘⌘H1+( v1   )(↵+⌘⌘L) .
The multiplier depends on two sets of parameters. First, the parameters modulating gen-
eral equilibrium adjustments in the labor market: the land share in agricultural production,
↵, and the distributional parameter v1   , which represents the elasticity of the agricultural
labor supply to the relative wage, as can be seen in equation (13). The multiplier is decreas-
ing in both; intuitively, a higher ↵ implies a larger change in agricultural wages following
a given shift in relative labor supply, while a higher v1   implies a larger reallocation of
labor following a given change in the relative wage. Second, the parameters controlling
general equilibrium effects in the goods market: the elasticities of the agricultural price
with respect to the human capital stock, ⌘⌘H , and agricultural labor, ⌘⌘L. The larger these
elasticities, the more human capital growth is reflected in higher agricultural prices rather
than lower agricultural employment. The GE multiplier is likely to vary across countries,
for example as a function of their stage of development or their openness to trade. While a
country-specific quantification of the multiplier is beyond the scope of the paper, the next
subsections propose two illustrative calculations under different sets of assumptions.
Calibration for Small Open Economies. We consider first a small open economy,
for which ⌘ = 0. In this case, the GE multiplier only depends on ↵ and v1   , which can
be mapped into observables as follows. First, ↵ corresponds to the land income share in
agriculture, which Herrendorf et al. (2015) estimate to be around 7% in the United States.
Land, however, may play a larger role in low-income countries, where agricultural production
is less capital intensive; for example, Gollin and Udry (2017) estimate production functions
for micro plots in Uganda and Ghana and find land shares of 40%-50%. We therefore
consider values of ↵ in the 0.07-0.5 range.
Second, we use information on wage dispersion in non-agriculture to bound v1   . The
within-cohort variance of log non-agricultural wages implied by the model is
Var [logwM,t (c, ")] = (1   )2Var [log " | log "   log "ˆt (c)] 
✓
1   
v
◆2
, (17)
where the equality uses the equilibrium wage, and the inequality is due to the properties
of the Beta distribution.32 The within-cohort standard deviation corresponds therefore to
an upper bound for v1   , which we can use to compute a lower bound for the GE multiplier
(which, as discussed above, is decreasing in v1   ). While our dataset does not include
wages for most countries, Lagakos et al. (2018) provided us with the value of the within-
cohort standard deviation for each of the 18 countries in their sample, spanning the income
32If " ⇠ Beta (v, 1), then   log " ⇠ Exp (v). Also, the variance of a truncated exponential is smaller than
the unrestricted variance, which is v 2.
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distribution from Bangladesh to the United States.33 The average standard deviation across
these countries is 0.67, with no systematic correlation with GDP per capita. We therefore
use v1   = 1/0.67 = 1.5.
Combining the values for the two parameters, we find a GE multiplier for small open
economies ranging between 0.4 and 0.9, with low values in this range more likely to apply to
low-income countries. Given a multiplier in the middle of this range, this exercise suggests
that the inferred downward shift of the agricultural labor supply can account for about
20-25% of the observed rate of labor reallocation.
Table IV: Estimating the GE Multiplier
Dependent Variable: log gLA,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log t 0.794 1.161 0.566 0.471 0.814
(0.150) (0.470) (0.183) (0.264) (0.367)
log St 0.762
(0.299)
log t ⇥ Middle Income -0.376
(0.445)
log t ⇥ Low Income -0.389
(0.501)
Country FE NO YES NO NO NO NO
Income Group FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS
F Stat First Stage - - - - 188.28 -
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The General Case: A Regression Approach. The calibration above only applies to
small open economies; given the reduced form nature of the price equation (12), we do not
pursue a direct calibration of ⌘⌘H and ⌘⌘L. As an alternative approach, we go back to the
data and use variation in the estimated cohort component to estimate the GE multiplier
directly. The idea follows from equation (16): the larger the GE multiplier, the more the
variation in the cohort component should be reflected in corresponding variation in the
reallocation rate; at the extreme, if the GE multiplier is equal to 0 (i.e. ⇥s = 1), larger
33Refer to Lagakos et al. (2018) for data description and details. Wages are constructed as earnings
divided by total hours of work in the period of observation, which is either weekly, monthly, or yearly. We
drop the top and bottom 1% of wages to check that the variance estimates are not driven by outliers. For
each country, we keep the most recent available cross-section.
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cohort components would be compensated exactly by smaller year components, with no
impact on the reallocation rate.
To implement this, we consider a stochastic version of the model, where cohort-level
human capital hc, technology zt and the demand shifter ✓t are subject to temporary shocks
that divert them from their constant growth path: hc = h0gch⇠h,c, zt = z0gtz⇠z,t and ✓t =
✓0gt✓⇠✓,t, with Ec [log ⇠h,c] = Et [log ⇠z,t] = Et [log ⇠✓,t] = 0. In Appendix E.5 we show that in
the frictionless benchmark the (annualized) cohort component between t and t + k can be
written as
log t =    ⌫
1   
"
log gh +
1
N + 1
1
k
kX
s=1
log
⇠h,t+s
⇠h,t 1 N+s
#
and the corresponding reallocation rate as
log gLA,t = (1 ⇥D)
⌫
1   

log g✓z +
1
k
log
⇠✓z,t+k
⇠✓z,t
 
+ (1 ⇥S) log t (18)
where ⇠✓z,t ⌘ ⇠⌘✓,t⇠1 ⌘⌘zz,t .3435 The variation in log t is driven by cross-sectional differences
in log gh and over-time differences in the average realizations of human capital shocks for
cohorts entering and exiting the labor market between t and t+k. The variation in log gLA,t
is driven by the cohort component as well as the unobserved growth rate and fluctuations of
technology and demand. We estimate (18) using the country- and year-specific reallocation
rates and cohort components computed in Section 3; Table IV displays the results.
Column 1 shows the pooled regression with no additional controls; the implied GE
multiplier is around 0.8. This specification relies on log t being uncorrelated with log g✓z
and log ⇠✓z,t+k⇠✓z,t , which might not hold if human capital is accumulated faster in anticipa-
tion of a faster decline in the demand for agricultural labor. Column 2 introduces country
fixed effects, which absorb the cross-sectional variation in log g✓z and log gh; the identifying
assumption is that temporary shocks to cohort-level human capital of entering and exit-
ing cohorts are uncorrelated with contemporaneous realizations of technology and demand
shocks (while log gh can be correlated with log g✓z).36 The resulting GE multiplier is higher
34For these expressions, we defined gLA,t as the growth rate of the geometric average of the cohort-
level agricultural employment shares; this guarantees that the reallocation rate is log-separable in average
human capital growth and cohort-level shocks. In practice, the correlation between the growth rates of the
geometric and arithmetic averages of cohort-level agricultural employment is 0.99.
35The version of the model with frictions loses analytical tractability when introducing temporary shocks,
given that the dynamic sectoral choice problem would need to take into account the possible future real-
izations of all shocks and their consequences on prices and cohort-level employment shares. Equation (18)
applies exactly in the frictionless model, and can be thought of as an approximation for the model with
frictions when the variance of the shocks and/or frictions are not too large.
36This requires that cohorts entering and exiting at time t do not base their (life-time) human capital
accumulation decision on the realization of the ⇠✓z,t shock. This would automatically hold in a model
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than in column 1, though more imprecisely estimated. One issue with this specification is
that the within-country variation in our dataset is limited, as for most countries we have few
repeated cross-sections to work with. Column 3 shows a more parsimonious specification
that includes fixed effects for the three income groups used in the rest of the paper, which
absorb the variation in log gh and log g✓z between countries at different levels of development;
this gives a more precise estimate of 0.56.
The rest of the Table reports extensions and robustness checks. Given that we use
log gLA,t in the computation of log t, one concern is that noise or measurement error might
generate spurious correlation between the two.37 To address this possibility we construct
an alternative measure of log t based on cohort-level schooling data and the empirical
relationship between schooling and cohort effects estimated in Section 4; in particular, we
compute CˆSc,j =  ˆsc,j, where  ˆ = 0.113 is taken from Table II, define
log St,j =
1
k
log
0@Pt+kc=t+k N nt+k,c,j exp
⇣
CˆSc,j
⌘
Pt
c=t N nt,c,j exp
⇣
CˆSc,j
⌘
1A
and use it as a regressor in column 4; the resulting multiplier is marginally higher compared
to column 3. In column 5 we use the average estimated cohort effects for exiting cohorts only
as an instrument for log t, based on the idea that it is even more unlikely that individuals
base their life-time human capital decisions on the expected realization of shocks at the end
of their career; the results are again quantitatively similar to the benchmark in column 3.
Finally, column 6 allows the coefficient to vary across income groups; the implied multipliers
span the 0.4-0.8 range, with higher values for high-income countries.
Overall, this exercise leads to similar conclusions to the calibration considered above.
The GE multiplier is likely to somewhat attenuate the partial equilibrium impact of human
capital growth. The attenuation is slightly stronger in low-income countries, consistently
with a larger degree of decreasing returns to labor in countries where agriculture is more
land-intensive. Based on an average multiplier of around 0.55, we conclude that human
capital growth can account for about 20% of the observed reallocation out of agriculture.
where shocks are serially uncorrelated and human capital decisions are taken before the realization of the
technology and demand shocks. As discussed below, we find similar results when focusing on the variation
induced by exiting cohorts only.
37The direction of the bias is ambiguous ex ante. Noise in the agricultural employment of entering and
exiting cohorts generates a spurious positive correlation between overall reallocation and the cohort com-
ponent, while noise in the agricultural employment of other cohorts generate a spurious positive correlation
between overall reallocation and the year component (and, as a consequence, a negative one between overall
reallocation and the cohort component). We illustrate this point in Appendix E.5.
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6.3 Discussion
To conclude this section, we discuss how variations to some of the model’s assumptions
might affect the magnitude and interpretation of our quantitative results.
Preferences for Non-Agriculture. Our model maps cohort-level differences in agricul-
tural employment into changes in hc, a cohort-level attribute that makes individuals more
productive in the non-agricultural sector. In practice, the non-monetary value of working
in non-agriculture might be growing across cohorts as well, perhaps as a result of changes in
the quantity, quality and content of their education. We discuss an augmented setup where
hc reflects a combination of productivity and preferences in Appendix E; within that set-
ting, we show that the cohort component captures the supply shift induced by both factors,
irrespective of their (unobservable) relative importance. While changes in preferences and
productivity imply different degrees of price adjustments, we show that the two approaches
in Section 6.2 still recover the appropriate GE multiplier, again without the need of taking
a stand on the relative importance of the two.
Human Capital Accumulation Over the Life-Cycle. Our model abstracts from hu-
man capital accumulation over the life-cycle. There could be two types of life-cycle effects:
(i) general human capital (i.e hc increasing as a cohort ages), and (ii) human capital specific
to the sector of employment. Recall that we identify year, cohort and age effects under the
linear restrictions that age effects are zero in the first years an individual is in the labor
market (as implied by the model). If individuals accumulate general human capital while
young, leading them to move out of agriculture, we would overestimate the year component
– thus underestimating the cohort component and attenuating our results. Sector-specific
human capital would work in the opposite direction. As noticed by Lee and Wolpin (2006),
sector-specific experience acts as a barrier to mobility. If individuals accumulate in the first
years on the job skills which make them more likely to stay in agriculture, then we would
underestimate the year component. In practice, whether our results are biased upwards
or downwards depends on whether experience human capital is general or sector-specific.
Estimates from Altonji et al. (2013), although coming from the United States only, suggest
that most experience human capital is general. Similarly, Lee and Wolpin (2006) find that
the degree of sectoral specificity of work experience does not appear to be an important
determinant of the relative size or growth of sectors.
Endogenous vs Exogenous Human Capital Accumulation. Human capital growth
is likely to be driven in practice by a combination of (i) endogenous responses to expected
changes in the relative demand for agricultural labor and (ii) other factors, unrelated to
sectoral demands, affecting the supply and demand for education. In Section 4 we consider
changes in schooling driven by factors plausibly belonging to (ii), and show that they are
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reflected in changes in agricultural employment. The model on the other hand treats gh as
exogenous, and as such it does not attempt to separately quantify (i) and (ii); the cohort
component maps into the overall impact of human capital on agricultural labor supply,
irrespective of its drivers.38 The combination of these approaches tells us that human capital
growth contributes to structural change, and educational policies increasing the former are
likely to accelerate the latter.
7 Conclusion
This paper explores the hypothesis that the steep increase in human capital during the
20th century contributed to the process of structural transformation, by equipping the new
generations of workers with skills more useful outside of the agricultural sector.
We use theory and evidence to support this hypothesis. Drawing on micro data from
many countries at different levels of development, we document that a large part of the
aggregate rate of labor reallocation out of agriculture was driven by new cohorts entering the
labor market, as opposed to movements across sectors for given cohorts. Using information
on cohort-specific educational attainment and a newly compiled dataset on educational
reforms and other relevant political events, we provide evidence for the fact that the increase
in schooling for more recent cohorts led to a sharp reduction in the agricultural labor supply.
A model of frictional labor reallocation out of agriculture provides a structural interpretation
of our empirical results, suggesting that, taking into account general equilibrium effects,
human capital growth explains about 20% of the observed rate of labor reallocation.
We emphasize two important implications of these results. First, while theories of struc-
tural change typically focus on factors decreasing the demand for agricultural labor, supply-
side changes in the workforce composition and skills - what we call the “human side” of
structural transformation - are quantitatively important. Second, to the extent that human
capital growth can be promoted by increased access to schooling and educational reforms,
these policies should be considered potential tools to accelerate the process of structural
transformation.
38In Appendix E.7 we perform back of the envelope calculations on the relative role of (i) and (ii) for
the historical experience of the countries in our sample, guided by a simple extension of the model where
hc responds endogenously to relative wages, in the same spirit as recent work by Adão et al. (2020). We
find that drivers of human capital growth exogenous to sector-specific demands account for 2/3 or more of
the estimated cohort component; this conclusion is driven by a low cross-country correlation between the
cohort and year components.
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